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Abstract 
Criminal law in Canada is established by the federal government and should therefore be applied 
equally across the country. However, the nature of independent police departments in every 
jurisdiction can result in the uneven application of the law. Evidence suggests that cannabis 
possession laws are one such example. Although cannabis has been illegal in Canada since 1923, 
some police departments appear to have de facto changed cannabis possession criminalization 
through reduced enforcement rates. The set of circumstances unique to this situation – the lack of 
a central political actor and the decentralized nature of the enforcement by police officers – 
results in a new mechanism by which policy outcomes can change, namely implementation 
conversion. Specifically, this thesis attempts to answer two research questions: (1) is 
implementation conversion in the enforcement of cannabis laws taking place across jurisdictions 
in Canada, and (2) is there equal enforcement across jurisdictions over time, and if not, what are 
some of the factors that affect police officers’ decisions to charge an individual for a drug crime? 
To this end, a charge rate was calculated with data from Statistics Canada for four different drug 
offenses to determine the likelihood that a police officer in a particular jurisdiction would charge 
an individual for a drug offense. Data from 49 jurisdictions over a 16-year period were used to 
run the analysis. A graphical and regression analysis of the four dependent variables was 
undertaken. The data showed a significant decline in the enforcement of cannabis possession 
over time across nearly all jurisdictions; this decline was not found in the enforcement of the 
other three drug offenses that were examined (specifically, cannabis trafficking, distribution and 
production (TDP), cocaine possession, and cocaine TDP). Among the variables that were 
examined as factors affecting cannabis possession charge rates, provincial dummy variables and 
the type of police force (e.g., RCMP, municipal) were found to be statistically significant. The 
findings in this thesis reveal the influence that street-level bureaucrats have in determining the 
implementation of legislation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Cannabis policy in Canada has been a highly controversial issue for several decades. While there 
was no documented debate when cannabis was declared illegal in 1923 (Carstairs, 2000), 
cannabis policy has received increasing attention since the 1960s, when its popularity sharply 
increased among a certain segment of the population (Erickson & Fischer, 1995). Cannabis 
policy was brought into the forefront of mainstream politics by two influential Senate reports, in 
1972 and 2002, which recommended to the government that marijuana be decriminalized and 
legalized, respectively (Canadian Senate 1972; Canadian Senate 2002). The prospect of either 
decriminalization or outright legalization of cannabis over the years helped to mobilize 
stakeholders who opposed such efforts for a variety of moral, economic, social, and health 
reasons. In contrast, many citizens find cannabis, similar to alcohol, to be a preferred recreational 
substance, and feel there is very little harm in its use. More recently, influential reports had 
echoed the call for a change to recreational cannabis policy (Carter & Macpherson, 2013; LSE 
ideas, 2014), and the Liberal government responded in the Spring of 2017 with legislation that 
aims to legalize the sale and possession of recreational cannabis by July 2018 (Kirkup, 2017). 
This change to cannabis policy is in line with public opinion polls, which found that 68% of 
Canadians were at least somewhat supportive of cannabis legalization (Leblanc, 2016b). After 
much debate over many years, cannabis policy is likely to undertake a fundamental shift towards 
full regulation and legalization over the next two years. 
Cannabis has been an illegal substance since the 1920s, and will remain an illicit substance under 
the Criminal Code of Canada until legislation is passed by the federal government. In Canadian 
Law, Section 91 of the Constitution Act of 1876 provides jurisdiction to the federal government 
over criminal law (Government of Canada, 2012). Therefore, cannabis’ inclusion in the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act – a piece of criminal law – can only be changed by the 
federal government. While successive judicial challenges to the prohibition of medical cannabis, 
beginning in 2000 (R v. Parker, 2000), have resulted in the creation of a federally-supported 
medical marijuana program in effect today, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
criminalizes both the sale and possession of recreational cannabis. Individuals charged with 
cannabis-related offences under the Criminal Code may face fines, jail time, and/or lifetime 
criminal records. 
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Given that cannabis offenses are federal law, they should apply equally across the country; 
however, the provinces have jurisdiction over the administration of justice (Government of 
Canada, 2012). The provinces often grant this jurisdiction to larger municipalities that can 
provide their own policing services. Smaller municipalities are provided policing services by 
either a provincial police force (as in Ontario or Quebec) or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP). The collection of individual police departments across the country can lead to differing 
enforcement policies by individual police departments.  
In addition, the police forces that carry out enforcement may have different goals and objectives 
than the government, regardless of their jurisdiction. Recent evidence suggests that the unequal 
enforcement of cannabis laws is occurring throughout Canadian jurisdictions; a Globe and Mail 
article revealed that, in 2012, the enforcement of penalties for cannabis possession varied 
substantially between Canadian cities (Offman & Hui, 2014). If caught and processed by local 
law enforcement, a resident of Saskatoon had an 82% chance of being charged with possession 
of cannabis, while a resident of Halifax only had an 18% chance of being charged; the Canadian 
average was 42% (Offman & Hui, 2014). These findings suggest that law enforcement agencies 
were selectively enforcing cannabis laws. 
This change in the enforcement of cannabis laws can emerge in different ways. One way is 
through what is known as policy conversion in which policy and institutions are actively 
redirected to achieve ends that are different from the original purpose of the policy or institution, 
without changing the formal rules (Hacker, Thelen, & Pierson, 2013). This process does not 
appear to be operating in Canada, since there is no evidence that cannabis policy has been 
redirected in the way that Hacker, Thelen, & Pierson (2013) have outlined. Instead, the source of 
the change in enforcement appears to be taking place at the implementation level. 
In theory, policy implementation is a simple concept, defined as the process by which 
“…governments put policies into effect” (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, pg. 12). In reality, 
however, the process of policy implementation is highly complex and requires coordination 
across the activities and functions of many different stakeholders and levels of government. 
Moreover, adequate and ongoing resources need to be secured to finance implementation, 
support from special interest and political groups needs to be maintained, and clearances by 
regulatory agencies need to be obtained (Bardach, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1974). When 
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the implementation process includes the enforcement of criminal law, section 91 of the 
Constitution Act of 1867 (Government of Canada, 2012) grants jurisdiction over the 
administration of justice to the provinces. Thereby each province has the constitutional authority 
to administer criminal law through policing and prosecutions, with policing usually acting as the 
first line of enforcement. When criminal law requires the proper enforcement of a policy as a 
part of the implementation process, that policy needs to be enforced to be effective. If the 
enforcement of a particular law diminishes or ceases altogether, then the policy has – in effect – 
changed from its original mandate. 
Frontline public servants with substantial discretion in the execution of their duties are known as 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980). The actions (or inactions) of some law enforcement 
agencies suggest that these street-level bureaucrats do not view cannabis offenses with the same 
level of concern as they once did, possibly due to changing public sentiments and more urgent 
policing priorities (Offman & Hui, 2014). Law enforcement officers in Vancouver have 
conceded that cannabis possession is not a priority, while law enforcement officers in Toronto 
are encouraged to use their discretion (Powers, 2016).  
In this thesis, a new mechanism through which the outcome of a policy can change is 
highlighted, one that operates through the implementation stage; this mechanism is referred to as 
“implementation conversion.” Under implementation conversion, street-level bureaucrats who 
have been tasked with the enforcement of cannabis criminalization can de facto change the 
outcome of cannabis policy by focusing their enforcement efforts elsewhere. 
It is often difficult for government and public-sector managers to effectively monitor whether 
street-level bureaucrats are enforcing policies to their satisfaction. Governments attempt to take 
certain actions to improve the accountability of public servants and constrain the behaviour of 
street-level bureaucrats: job-specific instruction manuals are created for employees in the case of 
contingencies and the performance of departments and individuals are appraised and audited 
(Lipsky, 1980). Government officials may also reposition senior bureaucrats to either reward or 
punish their ability to attain the desired policy objectives of their department. These actions are 
undertaken by government and senior public servants with the goal of incentivizing and 
reinforcing certain behaviours in alignment with the desired policy objectives.  
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Some of the actions taken by the Harper federal Conservative majority government (2011-2015) 
could be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the likelihood of implementation conversion, by 
exerting more control over cannabis policy implementation and enforcement. In 2012, the 
Conservative government instituted mandatory minimum sentencing for individuals caught 
growing six or more marijuana plants with the purpose of trafficking (Fine, 2015a), the effect of 
which limited the discretion of judges in handing down sentences to offenders. The 
Conservatives had also embarked on a national five year anti-drug strategy, designed to increase 
funding to law enforcement agencies for tackling drug crimes, while concurrently reducing 
funding for drug treatment programs (Geddes, 2012). In 2015, they announced additional 
funding for the RCMP to focus on marijuana crimes, if they were re-elected (Press 2015). 
Funding of this nature ensures that street-level bureaucrats have less autonomy over their 
enforcement choices, and suggests that future funding will be contingent on the continued 
enforcement of drug crimes. These actions may ultimately prove to be ineffective, as the 
mandatory minimum sentencing for marijuana cultivation was recently overturned in Ontario 
(Fine, 2015b), and the federal Liberal government has introduced legislation to legalize 
recreational cannabis. Nevertheless, these actions were part of the Conservatives’ ‘tough-on-
crime’ approach to drug laws during their time in power, and may have helped to limit policy 
conversion and implementation conversion by constraining the actions of street-level 
bureaucrats.  
The purpose of this thesis is to undertake an analysis of drug enforcement data from several 
Canadian cities to investigate the differing enforcement of cannabis laws, and thereby determine 
whether implementation conversion is occurring in some jurisdictions. Even though cannabis is 
likely to be legalized by the end of 2018, there has been pressure to change cannabis laws for 
decades. The pressure to change cannabis laws, coupled with the growing public acceptance of 
cannabis, may have provided opportunities for implementation conversion to have occurred in 
advance of this change in policy.  
This thesis will also examine the classic understanding of policy conversion as an issue of 
interest on its own. The change in policy outcomes may be better understood in some cases by 
examining those individuals tasked with the ongoing enforcement and implementation of policy. 
Importantly, this thesis also provides the opportunity to conduct an initial examination of some 
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of the potential causes of implementation conversion over time. When implementation 
conversion arises, it is likely occurring through changes in enforcement, as ongoing 
implementation requires the ongoing application of rules or directives to be effective. If differing 
levels of enforcement are found across jurisdictions, this variation can also be exploited to 
examine which factors affect a police officers’ decision to charge an individual for a drug crime. 
More specifically, the research will seek to answer using empirical analysis the following 
questions: 
i. Is implementation conversion in the enforcement of cannabis laws taking place across 
jurisdictions in Canada? 
ii. Is there equal enforcement across jurisdictions over time, and if not, what are some of the 
factors that affect police officers’ decisions to charge an individual for a drug crime?  
To examine the posed research questions, the thesis is organized as follows: Firstly, cannabis’ 
legislative history and background will be explored, followed by a literature review of the 
seminal work on policy implementation, the characteristics of policy conversion, and a portrayal 
of implementation conversion. The thesis will then move into a description of the empirical data 
being used for the analysis, followed by an exploration of the likely relationships between the 
charge rate for several drug offenses (including cannabis possession) and various explanatory 
variables, such as population, province, year, provincial party, federal party, and others. A 
graphical analysis will then be carried out to obtain a preliminary sense of the extent to which the 
expected relationships occur.  
Since the graphical analysis is necessarily only partial in nature (i.e., only one explanatory 
variable can be examined at a time), the thesis then moves to regression analysis to examine the 
impact of the various explanatory variables while holding the effect of the others constant. In this 
analysis, the key explanatory variable of interest is Year, with the coefficient on this variable 
expected to be negative. The other explanatory variables are included to account for any key 
economic and political factors that might have increased or decreased systematically over time. 
If, after accounting for these factors, there is still a Year effect, then there is more confidence in 
the conclusion that the charge rate has declined over time.  
It is important to note that the empirical analysis carried out in this thesis is meant to explore the 
correlational relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables, rather than to prove 
6 
 
causal effects. Further analysis would have to be carried out on the data to make claims of causal 
effects; the concluding chapter will make recommendations for future research that could begin 
to probe such effects. The concluding chapter also includes a discussion of the results and policy 
implications. 
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2.0 Cannabis History and Background 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, a brief background of cannabis history in Canada was explored, which led into 
the preliminary finding that cannabis possession laws are not being enforced consistently across 
Canadian jurisdictions. After drawing on some initial literature, two research questions were 
posed which will guide the subsequent analysis and discussion in this thesis. Before this analysis 
can be undertaken however, it is important to provide both a political and historical context of 
cannabis in Canada. This chapter will detail cannabis’ legislative history in Canada, as well as 
outlining where the current federal political parties stand on the issue of cannabis policy.  
 
2.2 Legislative History of Cannabis in Canada 
Cannabis was a relatively unknown drug when it was made illegal and added to Canada’s 
Confidential Restricted List in 1923 (Carstairs, 2000). In Canadian Law, Section 91 of the 
Constitution Act of 1876 provides jurisdiction to the Federal Government over Criminal Law 
(Government of Canada, 2012). Therefore, cannabis’ inclusion into the Confidential Restricted 
List – otherwise known today as the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act – as a piece of 
criminal law, applies equally to all provinces and territories. The inclusion of cannabis as an 
illegal substance is not fully understood, especially considering that the first seizure of cannabis 
did not take place until 1932, almost a full ten years later (Schwartz, 2014). There are two 
prominent theories that have been suggested. The first is that cannabis was made illegal because 
Canada was under international pressure; it was discussed at several international meetings, 
culminating in the Geneva Convention (1924-1925), where ‘Indian Hemp’ was brought under 
international control (Carstairs, 2000). The second theory suggests that the writings by Judge 
Emily Murphy on marijuana contributed to public fears about the drug (Bourrie, 2012). In her 
writings, she warned the public that there were only three ways to rid oneself of a marijuana 
addiction: insanity, death or abandonment (Murphy, 1922). Regardless of its origins, the 
inclusion of marijuana as an illegal substance took place without any discussion from either the 
House or the Senate (Schwartz, 2014), resulting in a policy of cannabis criminalization that 
would remain in place for over 90 years.  
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Marijuana use did not become mainstream until the 1960s, when its popularity sharply increased 
among particular segments of the population (Erickson & Fischer, 1995). At that time, the 
maximum penalty for possessing small amounts of cannabis was six months in jail and a $1000 
fine – a summary conviction offense (Hathaway & Erickson, 2003).1  With the enactment of the 
Narcotic Control Act of 1961, simple possession of cannabis carried a maximum sentence of 
seven years imprisonment – tried by indictment (Usprich & Solomon, 1993).2 The Liberal 
government at the time responded to the increased mainstream acceptance of cannabis in Canada 
and the rising levels of criminal charges for cannabis offenses by appointing a Commission of 
Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in 1969 (Fischer, Ala-Leppilampi, Single, & Robins, 
2003). The Le Dain Commission, named after its chairman, Gerald Le Dain, published a report 
in 1972. This inquiry found that adults and youths alike predominantly used cannabis because 
they enjoyed it (Canadian Senate, 1972). Not wanting to criminalize individuals for seeking 
pleasure from cannabis use, and finding no evidence of long-term health implications, the Le 
Dain Commission recommended that cannabis use be decriminalized (Canadian Senate, 1972). 
The Liberal government at the time, however, made no changes to cannabis law. 
 
2.3 Challenges to Cannabis Criminalization 
Cannabis continued to be used recreationally by Canadians, despite its illegality. As a result, 
over 1.5 million Canadians had a criminal record for simple possession by 2002 (Nolin & 
Kenny, 2002). The Liberal government at the time decided to form two committees to study the 
issue of illicit drugs in Canada. The House of Commons Special Committee on the Non-Medical 
Use of Drugs recommended that small amounts of cannabis possession and cultivation be 
decriminalized (Torsney, 2002). The Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drug Use ultimately 
recommended that the sale and production of cannabis be licensed (Canadian Senate, 2002). 
Legislators, however, did not move to change cannabis laws.  
                                                 
1 A summary conviction offense is considered less serious, normally punishable by shorter prison terms and smaller 
fines.  
2 Indictable offenses are more serious criminal charges. There is no time limit for when an individual can be charged 
with an indictable offense.  
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Several judicial challenges have been made to cannabis prohibition, some of which have led to 
changes. The prohibition of cannabis for medical use was invalidated in 2000, when an epileptic 
patient challenged it under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (R v. Parker, 2000). 
This paved the way for further court challenges against the government for insufficient access to 
medical marijuana (R v. J.P., 2003; R v. Long, 2007; R v. Mernagh, 2011), which have led to the 
development of the medical marijuana program in effect today. Two concurrent cases reached 
the Supreme Court in 2003, which saw individuals challenge the constitutionality of cannabis 
prohibition under the Criminal Code (R v. Malmo-Levine; R v. Caine, 2003). In a joint decision, 
the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the constitutional challenge brought forth by these 
individuals. These judicial challenges have established precedent for the legal use of cannabis for 
medical purposes, but not for recreational purposes.   
As previously noted, the Liberal Party of Canada attempted to decriminalize cannabis possession 
in both 2003 and 2004. The first attempt at decriminalization is suggested to have failed because 
of concerns that US Customs officials might increase security at the borders, thereby damaging 
cross-border trade (Raaflaub, 2004). The Prime Minister at the time, Paul Martin, reintroduced 
the same decriminalization bill in 2004, but the no-confidence vote in parliament prevented the 
bill from being debated further (CBC News, 2005). After regaining control of the federal 
government in 2015, the Liberal Party of Canada, under Justin Trudeau, fulfilled a campaign 
promise and introduced legislation to legalize the sale and possession of recreational cannabis by 
July 2018 (Kirkup, 2017). Although the other two prominent federal parties are not opposed to 
this legislation, they have stated their priorities; the New Democratic Party (NDP) put forward a 
motion to decriminalize personal possession (Smith, 2016), and the Conservative Party of 
Canada have pressed the Liberal government to quickly enact a cannabis regulatory regime to 
protect adolescents (Leblanc, 2016a).  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
As this chapter outlined, cannabis was made illegal with little debate or fanfare in the 1920s 
(Schwartz, 2014), resulting in a policy of cannabis criminalization that remained for over 90 
years. Over the years, an increasing number of Canadians obtained criminal records for cannabis 
possession, leading to public debates about cannabis criminalization. The federal government 
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responded to this debate by considering changes to recreational cannabis policy in the 1970s 
(Canadian Senate, 1972), and again in the early 2000s (Canadian Senate, 2002). Although no 
changes were made to recreational cannabis laws, the prohibition on medical marijuana was 
struck down by the courts in 2000 (R v. Parker, 2000), which led to the development of the 
federally-supported medical marijuana program in effect today. After a few failed attempts in the 
early 2000s, the federal Liberal government of Justin Trudeau introduced legislation that would 
legalize the sale and production of recreational cannabis by July 2018 (Kirkup, 2017). The 
changing public sentiment towards cannabis use since the 1960s led to demands for changes in 
cannabis policy and possibly changes in the enforcement practices of police. These changing 
enforcement practices can be best understood by examining both policy implementation and a 
specific type of policy change – policy conversion.  
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3.0 Review of Relevant Theories 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, the concepts of policy conversion and implementation conversion were briefly 
introduced. Having now explored the historical and political context of cannabis’ history in 
Canada, it is important to describe the background literature from which policy conversion 
resulted as a theory. This chapter discusses policy implementation as a stage of the policy cycle, 
describes characteristics of policy conversion, and outlines how this thesis will contribute to our 
understanding of policy conversion and implementation conversion. 
 
3.2  Policy Implementation 
Policy implementation, which consists of  “the effort, knowledge, and resources devoted to 
translating policy decisions into action…” (Howlett et al., 2009, pg. 160), is one of the stages of 
a traditional policy cycle. The policy cycle, which highlights the ongoing nature of policy 
modifications (Brewer & DeLeon, 1983), has been refined over the years to typically include 
five distinct stages:  agenda-setting, policy formation, decision-making, policy implementation 
and policy evaluation (Howlett et al., 2009). Isolating the different policy cycle stages allows 
scholars to distinguish between the differing roles played by policy actors and institutions at each 
of the stages (Sobeck, 2003). Policy implementation, although a part of the policy cycle, has its 
own unique set of considerations and challenges. 
Seminal research on policy implementation has highlighted the numerous difficulties that 
governments face when implementing policy decisions (Bardach, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1974), highlighting that implementation is a more complex process than some believed 
(Hargrove, 1975). As an example, the case of a US federal inner-city employment program for 
minorities revealed how seemingly normal implementation circumstances, such as obtaining the 
required approvals, often become serious impediments, and how multiple decision points often 
result in lengthy delays (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1974). Bardach (1980) described the 
implementation process as “…strategic interactions among numerous special interests all 
pursuing their own goals…” (pg. 9). Even straightforward implementation needs to consider the 
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source of funds, approvals from regulatory agencies, and accountability mechanisms (Bardach, 
1980). The research that followed in the decades since this early work has produced a large body 
of work on policy implementation (Saetren, 2005), resulting in better understanding of the 
complexities associated with this stage of the policy cycle.  
When policy objectives require compliance from the target audience, the implementation stage 
also involves developing the method and scope of the desired compliance. Compliance can take 
the form of authority-based regulations; delegated or self-regulation, advisory committees or 
command-and-control regulation (Howlett et al., 2009). Command-and-control regulations that 
define criminal conduct include the laws enforced by police departments and the judicial system 
(Rosenbloom, 2007). These laws often outline the potential penalties for individuals in the event 
of any non-compliance with the policy. For criminal law to be made in Canada, a bill must first 
be passed through both the House of Commons and the Senate, later becoming an Act through 
proclamation (Government of Canada, 1998). Once the criminal law is enacted, the division of 
power outlined in the Constitution Act of 1867 grants jurisdiction to the provinces over the 
‘administration of justice’ (Government of Canada, 2012): the judicial system to prosecute, 
convict and punish offenders of the law, and law enforcement agencies to enforce criminal law. 
When administrative agencies empowered to enforce a policy through the law vary in their 
enforcement of that policy, the resulting change in the outcome of the policy is denoted as 
implementation conversion. 
 
3.3 Policy Conversion 
Policy conversion is a theory of institutional or policy change, whereby the original purpose of 
an institution or policy shifts to pursue different objectives than what was originally intended 
(Hacker et al., 2013; Thelen & Streeck, 2005).3 The formal institution or policy remains stable, 
but its impact is transformed through its redirection or re-interpretation by strategic actors. This 
is made possible because institutions and most large-scale policies can achieve multiple ends, 
                                                 
3 Institutions in the context of this thesis are defined in the formal sense, as “…formalized rules that are in principle 
obligatory and subject to third-party enforcement.” (Hacker et al., 2013, pg. 5). An example of a formal institution in 
this case would be the Criminal Code of Canada, although the specific elements outlined in the Criminal Code 
would not be considered a formal institution.   
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depending on how they are deployed or enacted (Hacker, 2004). Conversion may occur as a 
result of policymakers responding to real-world challenges by redirecting institutional resources 
(Thelen & Streeck, 2005). Conversion can also result from the actions of political actors, 
individuals or organized interests who had no influence on the creation of the rules, but attempt 
to pivot the institution or policy to pursue ends that are different from its original purpose 
(Hacker et al., 2013). Conversion allows for policies and institutions to be adapted over time, 
rather than replaced outright.  
The actors who pursue policy change through conversion do so because the opportunities to 
change policy or institutions through formal means are limited (Hacker et al., 2013). As many 
authors have noted, there are considerable roadblocks that prevent the legislative changing of an 
institution or policy. Vested interests encourage the continued existence of policy because of the 
positive feedback effects that are generated (Pierson, 2000), and the presence of veto players in 
some circumstances can increase policy stability (Tsebelis, 1995). Even the prospect of creating 
new institutions or policies can persuade previously neutral groups to oppose the new 
arrangements (Hacker et al., 2013). These political settings, where authoritative change is 
difficult, can create strong incentives among actors to seek change through less visible means 
(Hacker, 2004). Conversion, thereby, can be an attractive mechanism to bring about substantive 
changes, even in the face of significant obstacles to such changes. 
Conversion as a means of institutional or policy change is a more attractive option for political 
actors if a gap exists between the rules of an institution or policy and their enactment (Thelen & 
Streeck, 2005). Every institution and policy differs in the specificity of both its intended 
objectives and how it attempts to achieve those objectives. In the case of laws allowing for 
maternity leaves from the workplace, there is little room for reinterpreting this policy and how it 
is applied in the workplace. However, policies “…whose effects depend on interpretation and 
implementation by other actors…” (Hacker et al., 2013, pg. 12) are more likely to experience 
instances of policy conversion. This is especially true in instances of social policies that divide 
their authority between units of government (Hacker 2004a, pg. 247). In the case of police 
departments, their officers are tasked with the ongoing implementation of laws and rules, and are 
afforded high amounts of discretion in their work. Institutions or policies whose rules are 
14 
 
ambiguous, and whose enforcement depends on interpretation and discretion, are more likely to 
be targets of change through conversion.  
 
3.4 Policy Drift 
Policy drift is a mechanism of policy change that shares some similarities with policy 
conversion, but operates with some crucial differences. Policy drift occurs when there has been 
no formal revision of a policy, yet inaction by policy actors results in a transformation of the 
policy over time (Hacker 2004). For instance, the original policy may have been designed to 
protect citizens from a particular socioeconomic risk, but as these risks and other factors 
invariably change, the ability of the policy to achieve its original objectives may be reduced if 
updates and changes to the policy are not made (Hacker 2004). Policy drift occurs when these 
changes are not made, thus effectively changing the nature of the policy. 
Both conversion and drift are strategies for changing the outcomes of policies without changing 
the formal rules themselves, and both mechanisms of policy change are fostered by political 
settings that make authoritative policy change difficult (Hacker et al., 2013). The crucial 
difference between drift and conversion concerns the degree to which the policy affords 
“…actors discretion in their interpretation or enforcement” (Hacker et al., 2013, pg. 12). Policies 
that rely on their implementation by other actors are more prone to instances of conversion, such 
as the enforcement of laws by street-level bureaucrats. Policies that are unambiguous are more 
susceptible to drift, because their specificity won’t allow them to adapt over time to changing 
circumstances. An example would be minimum wage laws, which were designed to protect 
against socioeconomic risks, but became less effective over time because they weren’t tied to 
inflation. Although policy drift shares important elements with policy conversion, policy 
conversion is a better lens though which to study implementation conversion.  
 
3.5 Implementation Conversion 
All the examples used to illustrate policy conversion in the academic literature focus on 
centralized actors who convert institutions over time to meet their own needs. Thelen (2004) 
describes how, in Germany, the artisanal sector and organized labour slowly transformed a 
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framework that had been established to counter the organized labour movement into the system 
of vocational training and partnership between labour and capital that is present today. Hacker et 
al. (2013) uses several examples of how actors used the courts to change the functioning of 
institutions; companies used litigation to challenge regulations they felt were cumbersome, civil 
rights groups used the courts to expand the 1964 Civil Rights Act beyond its original aim, and 
domestic actors in Europe used the original articles of the European Union and the mechanisms 
embedded in the European Court of Justice to oppose national policies and increase the 
obligations of the member states, when they were originally designed to resist intrusion by the 
supranational bodies of the EU. Hacker (2004) showed how conversion was used by mostly 
Republican political actors to shift the burden of American health insurance onto individuals. 
Fundamental to all these examples is a centralized political actor or organized group who was 
able to change the original aims of the institution to serve their own ends without changing the 
rules themselves.  
The examples used in past research have not considered the instances of policy implementation 
that are carried out by a decentralized group of actors. When a policy depends on the ongoing 
application of the rules, and thereby continuous implementation, it affords opportunities in which 
the outcome of the policies can be changed without changing the formal policy. Those 
individuals tasked with continual enforcement or the application of a policy don’t have to be 
central political figures or powerful actors to change the outcomes of the policy; they can simply 
be bureaucrats at the street-level with some degree of discretion. Changes to the outcomes of a 
policy, brought forth by bureaucrats at the street-level, can also occur because of unintentional 
changes in behavior or actions, rather than explicit and purposeful actions. Street-level 
bureaucrats are described as “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the 
course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work…” 
(Lipsky, 1980, 3). These street-level bureaucrats can still affect policy through it’s 
implementation, even though their actions might not be coordinated.  
The original examinations of policy conversion as a mechanism of policy outcome change have 
not been studied from the perspective of ongoing enforcement by street-level bureaucrats, nor 
has it been studied from the perspective of shifting priorities rather than overt actions by political 
actors. Additionally, by studying the enforcement of a policy by a decentralized group of actors 
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over time, rather than focusing on one policy over time, additional characteristics of 
implementation conversion may be discerned.  
 
3.6 Implementation Conversion and Street-Level Bureaucrats 
Implementation conversion can occur across jurisdictions because of changing enforcement by 
street-level bureaucrats, driven by agency decisions and procedures. Law enforcement officers, 
judges and public lawyers are considered street-level bureaucrats who are expected to uphold 
laws, adhere to policies, and punish offenders, based on direction from senior officials, and 
agency procedures. As an example, Saskatoon’s police officers are strongly encouraged by their 
department to enforce small infractions, such as marijuana possession, as this ‘broken windows’ 
approach is believed to discourage more serious crimes later on (Offman & Hui, 2014). Police 
officers in Vancouver, however, are given the prerogative to focus their efforts on more serious 
criminal offenses, rather than marijuana offenses (Offman & Hui, 2014). Implementation 
conversion might also differ across jurisdictions depending on the proportion of petty crime vs. 
violent crime; those jurisdictions with higher instances of violent crime may commit fewer 
resources towards non-violent drug crimes, thereby lowering their enforcement levels. Agency 
procedures may also lead to implementation conversion across jurisdictions, as British 
Columbia, Quebec, and New Brunswick require all criminal charges to be reviewed and 
approved by a crown prosecutor before charges are laid, rather than allowing police to charge 
individuals directly, a procedure known as ‘charge approval’ (Cowper, 2012). Rumored to be a 
way of reducing the number of criminal prosecutions, a charge approval process allows for an 
independent assessment of the evidence and charges (Bolan & Hager, 2014). This may increase 
the instances of implementation conversion, depending on whether the crown prosecutors are 
less likely to recommend charges than the police officer.  
Implementation conversion can vary across jurisdictions because street-level bureaucrats may 
base their enforcement on departmental priorities and agency procedures unique to a jurisdiction. 
Implementation conversion may also occur across jurisdictions because of which level of 
government is directly administrating the law. The Constitution Act of 1867, section 91, outlines 
the division of power, allowing the federal government to determine criminal law, and the 
provinces to administer the law (Government of Canada, 2012). The provinces then grant 
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municipalities the right to provide and fund policing services themselves. Those municipalities 
who administer their own policing services are further removed from federal priorities and 
political ideology. Some municipalities on the other hand, contract their policing services to the 
RCMP, while some municipalities in Quebec and Ontario contract their provincial policing 
force. The RCMP, a federal police service, may align their policing practices with federal 
priorities, rather than municipal ones. If the federal government has taken a hard-line approach to 
drug offenses, but the municipality has not expressed the same sentiments, whether the police 
force in a jurisdiction is the RCMP may impact drug enforcement rates and thereby impact 
implementation conversion. Implementation conversion may occur across jurisdictions, 
depending on whether the federal, provincial or municipal government is administrating the law. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
As this chapter has outlined, command-and-control regulations use the law to define criminal 
conduct and rely on enforcement by police departments and the judicial system (Rosenbloom, 
2007). Policy conversion can occur when these policies are actively redirected to achieve ends 
that are different from their original purpose, without changing the formal rules (Hacker et al., 
2013). As was highlighted however, implementation conversion may also occur less deliberately 
when the policy or institution relies on street-level bureaucrats to achieve its ends. These street-
level bureaucrats may contribute to implementation conversion by focusing their enforcement 
efforts elsewhere, as driven by agency procedures, the type of police force present in a 
jurisdiction, or the type of crime occurring in a jurisdiction. To compare different enforcement 
agencies across jurisdictions requires the creation of a common measurement of enforcement 
rates, which will be described in the following chapter. 
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4.0 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the main purposes of this thesis was to explore whether implementation conversion has 
been occurring across Canadian jurisdictions. To this end, implementation conversion was 
explored as a concept, and the possibility was raised that street-level bureaucrats were 
contributing to implementation conversion in a variety of ways. To explore this possibility and to 
examine the research questions that were posed in Chapter One, it is necessary to outline the 
scope of the data, the creation of the dependent variables, and the limitations of this data. 
 
4.2 Dependent Variable Details 
The examination of the research questions was undertaken using a quantitative analysis of 
publicly available data collected from Statistics Canada and other sources. The key variable of 
interest is the charge rate – the likelihood that the relevant law enforcement agency for a 
particular city will charge an individual for a particular offence, given that the incident has been 
resolved. The charge rate is calculated for four dependent variables, each of which will be 
analyzed separately: cannabis possession, cocaine possession, cannabis trafficking, distribution, 
and production (TDP), and cocaine TDP. The cocaine offenses are used as a control or 
comparator group, allowing for insight into whether implementation conversion has only 
occurred with cannabis offenses. The calculation of the charge rate allows for a glimpse into 
policing priorities at the local and national level, the presence of implementation conversion, and 
the possible factors that may have led to implementation conversion across jurisdictions. 
The charge rate is determined from crime statistics collected by the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics (a division of Statistics Canada) through the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR) 
with co-operation from the policing jurisdictions across Canada. The source of information for 
UCR scoring is the police occurrence report (The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2016). 
For an incident to be included in the UCR, and thus as a crime statistic, a police officer involved 
with the incident must have written and submitted a police occurrence report. The police 
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occurrence report acts as a template from which statistics for specific crimes are counted and 
submitted to the UCR.4 The charge rate for an offense is calculated by the following formula: 
Charge Rate =
number of annual incidents resolved with a charge
number of annual incidents that are resolved  
An incident is considered ‘resolved’ when at least one individual involved with the incident is 
either charged, or when the incident is deemed ‘cleared otherwise’ (Gauthier, 2016). ‘Cleared 
Otherwise’ includes a number of possible outcomes, including police discretion, diversion 
programs for young offenders, and whether the suspect was charged with more serious offenses 
related to the incident (The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2016). It is usually the 
individual officers’ choice whether or not to submit a police occurrence report regarding an 
incident, as well as their choice to pursue charges regarding the incident.  
The calculation of the charge rate in this thesis is a better mechanism for understanding the 
factors that affect police discretion than an alternate dependent variable, such as charges per 
capita. Charges per capita, by using population as the denominator, doesn’t account for all the 
incidents where police officers report the crime but do not pursue charges. The charge rate, by 
including the total number of annual resolved incidents in the calculation, allows for an 
understanding of how police discretion may have changed over time, and will allow for an 
exploration of the factors that may influence police discretion.  
The crime statistics data are available from 1998-2014, and the data set compiled for the thesis 
includes 49 Canadian cities. Twenty-nine of these cities are Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), 
while the remaining twenty cities are made up of smaller, more rural-based cities from across the 
provinces (although no smaller, rural-based cities were chosen from Prince Edward Island or 
Quebec).5 These smaller cities were included to analyze and compare the enforcement practices 
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to municipal police forces. Thus, inclusion of 
                                                 
4 In large urban cities, the police occurrence report is typically translated and submitted to the UCR survey by the 
central records division of a police department. In small cities and rural jurisdictions, this process is likely handled 
by the same police officer throughout. 
5 A Census Metropolitan Area consists of one or more neighbouring municipalities situated around a core, with a 
total population of at least 100,000 of which 50,000 or more live in the core (Statistics Canada, 2015c). 
20 
 
the rural data provides a more comprehensive picture of implementation conversion across the 
country.  
The first step in the analysis is to examine implementation conversion – i.e., whether, where, and 
to what extent it is occurring across Canada. Once implementation conversion has been 
determined to be indeed occurring across Canadian jurisdictions, some of the factors that may 
contribute to implementation conversion will be explored by exploring the variation that exists 
across jurisdictions. This exploration is accomplished with a graphical analysis of the 
relationship between the charge rate and a set of explanatory variables; based on the results from 
this analysis a regression analysis was undertaken. 
The explanatory variables used in the analysis include the police force operating in the city 
(Municipal police force or RCMP), the governing party (e.g., Liberal, Progressive Conservative, 
New Democratic Party) of the province in which the city is located, the governing party of the 
federal government (Conservative or Liberal), the minority/majority status of the provincial and 
federal governments in place, the population of the city, and the violent and non-violent crime 
severity index for the city. Additionally, to examine whether judicial procedures contribute to 
implementation conversion, the charge approval process operating in some provinces will be 
analyzed. 
 
4.3 Limitations 
The method in which UCR data is collected and assembled from police reports, as well as the 
information that is not present in the data, introduces some inherent limitations. Firstly, the 
‘number of annual incidents that are resolved’ in each jurisdiction may be influenced by police 
officer discretion at the scene of the crime. Police officers are not required to file a police 
occurrence for every infraction that they witness, so if they come across an individual smoking 
cannabis, they may simply confiscate the cannabis, rather than expend resources and time to 
make an arrest. Secondly, some incidents may be labelled ‘cleared by charge’, even though an 
individual was never charged for the cannabis-related violation tied to the incident.  The UCR 
describes the Continuing Offense Rule, which “…acknowledges that often in police work several 
violations can be tied together because they either happened in a sequential manner, they repeat 
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over time, or they are all part of a larger case” (The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2016, 
pg. 19). The UCR is also incident-based, not violation-based, which means that “…an incident 
may be “cleared by charge”…if a charge is laid in connection with any of the violations on that 
incident” (The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2016, pg. 17). Thereby, an incident could 
include several violations, including cannabis possession. If one of the violations attached to the 
incident is cleared with a charge, then any other violations attached to the incident could also be 
recorded in the UCR as a cleared incident.  
For the results of this thesis to be meaningful, the impact of each factor that affects the charge 
rate has to be similar across all jurisdictions; in addition, the full set of factors that affect the 
charge rate have to be included in the analysis. To the extent that these requirements are not met, 
the resulting analysis and conclusions that are drawn from it may not be entirely accurate.  
 
4.4 Summary of Methods 
This thesis uses publicly available data from Statistics Canada, collected by police jurisdictions 
across Canada, to calculate a charge rate – the likelihood that the relevant law enforcement 
agency for a particular city will charge an individual for a particular offence, given that the 
incident has been resolved. The charge rate, by including the total number of annual resolved 
incidents in the calculation, is a better mechanism than charges per capita for allowing an 
exploration of the factors that may influence police discretion. The data set uses charge rates 
from 49 jurisdictions, and will include several explanatory variables, including the governing 
party of the province, population, the type of police force, and the violent and non-violent crime 
severity index for the city. Given our understanding of the data set and the calculation of the 
dependent variables, it will be important to understand the relationship that is likely to exist 
between the various explanatory variables and the charge rates.  
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5.0 Empirical Estimations and Questions 
5.1 Introduction 
Using the research questions as a guide, this thesis has explored cannabis’ background and 
history in Canada, the literature surrounding policy implementation and policy conversion, as 
well as the methodology that will be used in the analyses. Before an empirical analysis can be 
undertaken on the data, the chapter will explore the likely relationships between the various 
explanatory variables and the charge rates of the drug offenses. This will be done by using 
previous research and logic to understand the empirical relationships that are likely to exist 
between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables.   
 
5.2 Year (1998-2014) 
Over the past three decades, Canadian society has become increasingly tolerant of casual 
cannabis use among individuals. A 2014 poll found that nearly 60% of Canadians support the 
legalization of cannabis (Angus Reid Global, 2014), which has climbed nearly 30% in the past 
20 years (Grenier, 2013). This gradual softening of public opinion and perception was reflected 
in the Liberal governments’ announced legislation, which aims to legalize recreational cannabis 
use by July 2018 (Kirkup, 2017). Even before the proposed legislation, changing public attitudes 
surrounding cannabis and previous attempts by the federal government to decriminalize cannabis 
possession likely sent strong signals to police jurisdictions across Canada that enforcing the 
crime of cannabis possession is increasingly less in the public’s interest, and that other offenses 
should be prioritized in pursuing criminal charges. For these reasons, it is expected that, all else 
the same, there will be a downward trend in the charge rate for cannabis possession over the time 
period in question. In the context of the empirical analysis that will be carried out in subsequent 
chapters, the expectation is that there will be a negative relationship between the charge rate and 
the variable Year. The variable Year, which takes on values from 1998 to 2014, is a proxy 
variable that is meant to capture a set of behaviours that are the underlying cause of declining 
charge rates.  
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The other dependent variables – cannabis TDP, cocaine possession, and cocaine TDP – have not 
become significantly more tolerated by society during the observed time period. Cocaine use is 
likely perceived as highly risky, while supply-based cannabis and cocaine offenses are likely 
seen as enabling drug use. Police-reported cocaine offenses (both possession and TDP) have 
increased since 1998, but fallen from their peak in 2007, while cannabis TDP offenses per capita 
have remained constant (Cotter, Greenland, & Karam, 2015). Given these trends, police 
departments and officers have no overt reasons to become more tolerant towards these offenses. 
We would thereby expect consistent charge rates across the observed time period for these three 
dependent variables, all else being equal. 
 
5.3 Population Size 
No previous studies were found that link population size to enforcement practices. However, it is 
expected that population size could affect the resources available to police departments. Cities 
with large populations can spread the fixed costs of policing among a larger tax base. Thus, 
large-urban cities may have more resources available for pursuing charges and may apply 
different priorities to their policing than smaller cities. Cities may pursue charges for less severe 
crimes more frequently as a means of discouraging more serious crimes in the future. Regardless, 
decisions of whether to pursue charges are made in the context of limited resources and differing 
views of enforcement priorities. Given the lack of any previous studies, the determinants of this 
trade-off will thereby be posed as an empirical question; the sign on this coefficient is to be 
answered by the analysis.   
 
5.4 Police Force  
In Canada, all three levels of government have public-sector police forces: municipal police, 
provincial police, and The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).  Municipal police forces 
have been given the constitutional jurisdiction by their province to provide their own policing 
services (House of Commons Committee, 2012), and are administered and funded in full by their 
city. The RCMP is Canada’s national police service, providing policing services at the federal 
level, and also on a contract basis for all of the Canadian territories, eight provinces, and over 
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150 municipalities (RCMP, 2013), thereby serving approximately 15% of Canadians (House of 
Commons Committee, 2012). The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) is a provincial police force, 
that, similarly to the RCMP, provides policing services to municipalities and regions in Ontario 
that cannot provide them on their own. The central difference between the RCMP and the OPP is 
that the municipalities in Ontario who contract with the OPP are required to pay for the full cost 
of policing themselves, while the federal government pays for between 10-30% of the RCMP 
costs when municipalities require them (House of Commons Committee, 2012). For the analysis 
in this thesis, any jurisdiction policed by the OPP will be labelled as a ‘municipal police force’, 
given that both municipal police forces and provincial forces are fully funded by their own city, 
unlike the RCMP which receives part of its funding from the federal government.  
It is expected that jurisdictions policed by the RCMP will have higher charge rates than 
municipal police forces for all the dependent variables. Since no known study has examined 
whether differences exist in the policing practices between the RCMP and municipal forces, this 
expectation is built on the following logic. Firstly, the RCMP are more likely to service rural-
based populations than municipal police. According to one study, these rural-based populations 
are more likely to vote for conservative governments (Roy, Perrella, & Borden, 2015), and 
conservative voters in a jurisdiction may imply a bias towards stricter enforcement of drug 
offenses. Secondly, the RCMP, being a federal police service, may align their policing practices 
with federal priorities, rather than municipal priorities. Both Liberal and Conservative federal 
parties were in power from 1998-2014, and while Liberal governments believed that harsh 
punishments do not deter crimes and that criminal justice polices should be crafted by experts 
(Doob & Webster, 2015), the Conservative governments oversaw the creation and 
implementation of a number of ‘tough-on-crime’ criminal justice policies during their tenure 
(Kerr & Doob, 2015). This tough-on-crime stance may have affected the enforcement practices 
of the RCMP, given that the federal minister responsible for this department provides direction 
to the RCMP (House of Commons Committee, 2012). Municipal police forces are more 
insulated from these federal priorities and political ideologies, as they are funded by the 
municipality and are therefore more likely to align their policing practices with the priorities of 
the municipality. Some municipalities may have similar enforcement rates to the RCMP, but 
overall, the RCMP jurisdictions can be expected to have higher rates of enforcement, all else the 
same.  
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5.5 Provincial Government Parties 
In Canada, provincial governments have been formed by five different parties during the period 
of 1998-2014, all with different ideological beliefs and policy priorities, many of which mirrored 
the parties at the federal level. Many of the issues that these parties have campaigned on are 
regional issues and specific to the provincial circumstances at the time. The New Democratic 
Party (NDP) is the most left-leaning of the provincial parties, occupying the centre-left of the 
political spectrum, and encouraging policies that expand the social safety net for citizens 
(McCullough, 2016). Progressive Conservative (PC) parties often mirror the values of their 
federal counterpart, the Conservative Party of Canada, as do the provincial Liberals. The 
Saskatchewan Party has governed the province of Saskatchewan since 2007, and is a coalition of 
Liberal and Conservative supporters (McCullough, 2016). The Parti Quebecois (PQ), who 
governed in Quebec from 1998-2003, and 2012-2014, ran on a platform of separation from the 
rest of Canada and provincial sovereignty (McCullough, 2016). Although the same parties do not 
align perfectly along ideological lines across provincial boundaries, many of their beliefs and 
values are consistent across the country.  
Although some provincial governments might be more ideologically aligned with a tough-on-
crime criminal justice platform (such as the Saskatchewan Party and PC parties), provincial 
governments have little ability to control the actions and discretion of police departments in their 
municipalities. Firstly, policing responsibilities have been largely delegated to municipalities by 
the provinces (House of Commons Committee, 2012), thereby providing a buffer between 
provincial government ideology and municipal police boards. Secondly, Section 91 of the 
Constitution Act of 1876 provides jurisdiction to the Federal Government over criminal law 
(Government of Canada, 2012), which gives the provincial governments fewer opportunities to 
send signals to police departments about their preferred enforcement practices. Thirdly, there 
was no evidence to be found which suggested that provincial conservative parties made criminal 
justice and policing a centerpiece of their time in government. For these reasons, it is expected 
that there will be no observed difference between enforcement rates and the provincial party in 
power throughout the observed time period, all else being equal. 
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5.6 Federal Government: Liberal vs. Conservative  
The two main governing parties in Canadian federal politics are the Liberals and the 
Conservative Party of Canada. The Liberals, who governed from 1993 to 2006, were fiscally 
conservative and socially progressive; they championed balanced budgets and eliminating the 
budget deficit during their time in power, while legalizing same-sex marriage and supporting 
popular social programs (McCullough, 2016). Along the political spectrum, the Liberals occupy 
the centre-left of the political spectrum. The Conservative Party of Canada, who governed from 
2006 to 2015, “favours low taxes, smaller, less intrusive government, a strong regime of law-
and-order, a strong military and respect for traditional values” (McCullough, 2016). The 
Conservatives are generally thought to be on the centre-right of the political spectrum. Both 
parties instituted criminal justice policies while in power, but only the Conservatives made it a 
centerpiece during their time in government.  
The differences between the Liberals and the Conservatives in their attitude towards drug 
offenses and criminal justice polices while in government were quite clear. During the Liberal 
reign, Prime Minister Jean Chretien proposed two bills to decriminalize cannabis possession 
(Raaflaub, 2004), and spoke out in favor of changing cannabis possession laws (Fischer et al., 
2003). The Liberal belief towards crime and justice polices was that harsh punishments do not 
deter crime, and that the development of criminal justice policy should be crafted by experts 
(Doob & Webster, 2015). During the Conservative Party’s time in power, a number of ‘tough-
on-crime’ criminal justice policies were enacted (Kerr & Doob, 2015); these policies were a 
reflection of a belief that crime can be reduced through harsher punishments (Doob & Webster, 
2015). It is expected that these policy initiatives sent a signal to municipal police departments 
and the federally directed RCMP that they expect individuals to be punished for crimes. Or, as 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper himself stated in 2014, ‘do the crime, do the time’ (Doob & 
Webster, 2015). For these reasons, it is expected that the enforcement rates will be higher for all 
the dependent variables while the Conservative Party was in power, all else being equal. 
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5.7 Crime Severity Index – Violent and Non-Violent  
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is published by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics and 
Statistics Canada, and tracks “changes in the severity of police-reported crime by accounting for 
both the amount of crime reported by police in a given jurisdiction and the relative seriousness of 
these crimes” (Statistics Canada, 2015a). The seriousness of crimes is calculated by assigning a 
weight, or value, to each type of offense. The weights are derived from the average incarceration 
sentences across all Canadian provinces and territories, and are updated every five years 
(Statistics Canada, 2015a). More serious offenses are given higher weights, while relatively 
minor offenses are given smaller weights.6 The CSI is then calculated by multiplying the number 
of police-reported incidents in a jurisdiction for a given offense by the offense weight, and then 
dividing that total by the corresponding population of each jurisdiction. The CSI can be broken 
down into two separate indexes – the Violent Crime Severity Index (V-CSI) and the Non-Violent 
Crime Severity Index (NV-CSI), both of which will be analyzed in turn.  
A high value of the V-CSI in any jurisdiction could bring about several changes to the dependent 
variables. A jurisdiction with a high V-CSI (300-400) could petition their municipality for 
increased police resources, resulting in more officers and a greater likelihood that those officers 
will expend their time and police resources on drug charges. A high V-CSI value may also 
encourage police departments to charge all crimes at a higher rate, including drug crimes, to 
discourage crime in general. Alternatively, a jurisdiction with a high V-CSI value could instead 
encourage their police department to focus on expending officer time and department resources 
on violent crimes, rather than non-violent drug crimes. Given the absence of empirical research 
on the effects of the V-CSI on policing in Canadian jurisdictions, and the differing viewpoints 
outlined above, the effect of the V-CSI on the dependent variables will thereby be posed as an 
empirical question in the analysis of the data.  
High values of the NV-CSI in any jurisdiction may also bring about different changes to the 
dependent variables. A jurisdiction with a high NV-CSI may indicate a higher incidence of drug 
crimes, which may have led to the creation or expansion of a specialized drug crime unit within 
                                                 
6 Some examples of weights for the Crime Severity Index: Murder (1st and 2nd degree) – 7042, Manslaughter – 1822, 
Robbery – 583, Breaking and Entering – 187, Theft over $5000 – 139, Mischief – 30, Failure to Appear – 16, 
Cannabis Possession – 7 (Statistics Canada, 2015b). 
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the police department. Such a unit would be likely to increase the charge rate for the dependent 
variables of any jurisdiction. Conversely, a high NV-CSI could also be the result of different 
reporting practices for high volume, non-violent crimes between jurisdictions, without having 
impacted the charge rate of the dependent variables. Owing to the lack of empirical and 
theoretical research on the effects of the NV-CSI on policing in Canadian jurisdictions, and the 
differing hypotheses outlined, the effect of the NV-CSI on the dependent variables will also 
thereby be posed as an empirical question to be answered in the resulting analysis.  
 
5.8 Charge Approval Process and Judicial Practices 
In Canada, most police departments, except for those in British Columbia, New Brunswick, and 
Quebec, are responsible for collecting and reviewing evidence against a suspect, and then 
deciding whether that individual should be charged with a crime. Once the decision is made to 
charge an individual, the supporting evidence is forwarded to the province’s crown prosecutor, 
who then begins proceedings. However, British Columbia, New Brunswick, and Quebec employ 
a different procedure, known as ‘charge approval’ (Cowper, 2012) . The charge approval process 
requires that all criminal charges be reviewed and approved by a crown prosecutor before 
charges are laid, rather than allowing police departments to charge individuals directly 
(McCuaig, 2012). The charge approval process makes it less likely that the decision to charge an 
individual will be emotionally motivated, or driven by personal biases, as it allows highly trained 
and specialized crown prosecutors to determine whether it is in the public interest that a suspect 
is charged (McCuaig, 2012), and allows for an independent assessment of the evidence and 
charges (Bolan & Hager, 2014). British Columbia is also unique in that, since 1983, the Attorney 
General’s Department has required that there be a ‘substantial likelihood of conviction’ before 
charges can be laid, rather than the ‘reasonable likelihood’ that exists in other Canadian 
provinces (McCuaig, 2012). The crown prosecutor thereby performs a quasi-judicial function, by 
deciding whether the ‘substantial’ threshold was met. The use of the word ‘substantial’ was 
purposeful in its intent to require a stricter test than ‘reasonable’. It has been estimated that the 
use of the word ‘substantial’ raises the evidentiary threshold to 90%, whereas the reasonable 
standard is approximately 75% (Bolan & Hager, 2014). 
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When charges are forwarded to the respective crown prosecutors’ office for review when a 
charge approval is in place, the police officer involved is signalling that their intention is to 
pursue charges related to the incident; the incident meets their minimum threshold for available 
evidence and whether it is in the public interest to charge the suspect. The crown prosecutor in 
this case can either (1) approve the charges, or (2) refuse to approve the charges. In the absence 
of a charge approval process, the police officer was already going to pursue charges, so the 
crown prosecutor cannot increase the number of incidents that will be resolved with a charge. By 
refusing to approve the charges, the crown prosecutor can, however, lower the number of 
incidents that are resolved with a charge. For these reasons, it is expected that jurisdictions with a 
charge approval process will have either lower charge rates, or the same charge rates, as 
jurisdictions without a charge approval process, all else being equal. In addition, British 
Columbia, because of its ‘substantial’ evidentiary threshold, is expected to have the lowest 
charge rates across all the dependent variables.   
 
5.9 Minority vs. Majority Government 
In Canada’s parliamentary system, it is possible that the first-past-the-post electoral system at the 
provincial and federal level will result in a plurality vote; the winning party receives more votes 
than any other competing party, but does not receive a majority of the votes. In this case, a 
majority government can still be formed if the party won a majority of the seats in the House of 
Commons or their provincial legislature. If the party did not win a majority of the seats in the 
House of Commons or the provincial legislature, they can still form a minority government, as 
long as they can command the confidence of the House of Commons, or the Provincial 
Legislature, by working alongside and maintaining the approval of other parties and 
independents (Azzi & Kwavnick, 2012). Canada’s electoral system results in relatively few 
minority governments being formed, although there have been minority governments at the 
federal level, and in the provinces of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, and Saskatchewan during 
the years 1998-2014 (Wikipedia, 2016). 
Majority governments have more power and precedence to bring about policy change and 
establish policing priorities than minority governments. Minority governments are relatively rare 
in Canada, and therefore parties are not used to working together to bring about policy change 
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and establish priorities. Indeed, Canada has been seen as a ‘laggard’ when it comes to making 
minority governments work effectively (Shane, 2010), and the federal minority governments in 
2004 and 2006 were seen as excessively partisan (Good, 2010). The ability of federal and 
provincial minority governments to establish either formal or informal policing priorities is 
weakened when the government has to ensure coalition building in order to enact policy changes. 
Additionally, minority governments are less likely to send the requisite signals to influence 
policing priorities at the local level, or adjust criminal justice policies to reflect the desired 
enforcement rates, because of their perceived lack of power and the requirement to focus on 
fewer party-led priorities as a minority government. Majority governments on the other hand, are 
less likely to be challenged by opposition parties (Good, 2010), and can therefore govern more 
freely. However, these features of minority and majority governments do not hint at their 
governments’ preference for either more severe or less severe criminal justice policy. 
Additionally, as noted earlier, provincial governments have little power to control the actions and 
priorities of municipal police forces. For these reasons, this thesis will presume the effect of 
minority governments as an empirical question to be answered by the analysis.  
 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the likely relationships between the dependent variables and the 
explanatory variables, using previous studies and logic to determine the likely connection. The 
explanatory variables that were explored included population size, the violent and non-violent 
CSI, the type of police force, whether the governing party formed a majority or minority 
government, the provincial governing party, and the federal governing party. The next chapter 
will conduct a graphical analysis to assess the likely relationships that were made between these 
variables, and to begin to answer the research questions that were posed in chapter one.  
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6.0 Graphical Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of chapter one was to introduce the topic of examination, and to introduce the 
central research questions that would drive the analysis of the data. In the previous chapter, the 
likely relationships between the dependent and independent variables were investigated. The 
purpose of this section is to visually examine one or two variables at a time, to see if the 
anticipated relationships hold, and to begin to answer the central research questions.  
The first research question aims to look at whether implementation conversion is taking place 
across jurisdictions in Canada. Implementation conversion is a mechanism through which the 
outcomes of policy change through the collective actions of street-level bureaucrats. This shift in 
the policy outcomes is not thought to be the deliberate choice of a centralized policy actor, but 
instead occurs when the policy outcomes depend on decentralized implementation and 
enforcement. The formal policy remains stable, but its impact is transformed through its 
redirection or re-interpretation. The graphical analysis of the data carried out in this section 
examines whether the policy of cannabis criminalization and enforcement has undergone a 
change. The presence or absence of implementation conversion is measured by examining the 
charge rates over time in the observed Canadian jurisdictions for cannabis possession and for 
trafficking, distribution, and production (TDP). These rates can be observed from different 
perspectives – from a national or provincial perspective, and at the more local jurisdictional 
level. Cocaine charge rates will also be observed alongside the cannabis charge rates to 
determine whether implementation conversion is occurring across different drug offenses.  
 
6.2 Implementation Conversion – National Trends 
Nationally, cannabis possession has experienced significant declining charge rates compared to 
the other drug offenses. As Figure 6.1 shows, only cannabis possession charge rates declined by 
more than 10% throughout the observed period, as compared to the other drug offenses. The 
national median charge rate for cannabis possession declined from 79% in 1998 to 49.5% in 
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2014, representing a decline of 37.2% over 17 years.7 This drop in the charge rate for cannabis 
possession is policy significant, as the decline in the cannabis possession charge rate was much 
more rapid than the gradual decline observed in the other drug offenses. Of note, is the period 
2002-2003; the national median charge rate for cannabis possession declined from 74.5% to 
59%, a 20.6% decline over one year. This drop in the charge rate was likely influenced by the 
Liberal governments’ attempts to decriminalize cannabis possession in 2002 and 2003. Table 6.1 
summarizes the percentage change from 1998 to 2014 of the national median charge rates 
(labelled as ‘Canada’) for each drug offense, and demonstrates that cannabis TDP (3.4%), 
cocaine possession (7.7%), and cocaine TDP (1.4%) all declined over time by much smaller 
margins as compared to cannabis possession (37.2%). The time trend for cannabis possession is 
statistically significant at the 99% level. None of the time trends for the other offenses were 
statistically significant. 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
7 Each median value in this graphical analysis considers all the charge rates from each jurisdiction in one year, and 
represents the middle value of this data set. By using the median value instead of the mean, this analysis is less 
likely to be skewed by abnormally high or low charge rates.  
Figure 6.1 – National Median Charge Rates – Cannabis and Cocaine Offenses 
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6.3 Implementation Conversion – Provincial Trends 
As both Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 highlight, all the provinces, (except for British Columbia, 
whose change was positive) experienced large and statistically significant declining charge rates 
for cannabis possession. The remaining drug offense charge rates declined by much smaller 
margins over time. Table 6.1 summarizes the median charge rates of all provinces in 1998 and 
2014, as well as the percentage change that occurred between these two points in time. All the 
provinces, except for British Columbia and Quebec, had their charge rate for cannabis possession 
decline by more than 36%. Cocaine possession charge rates have also declined in most 
jurisdictions, although by much smaller margins. Table 6.1 also shows that the TDP offenses 
among the provinces also tended to decline by small margins over time, the exceptions being 
British Columbia, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, whose charge rates declined by larger 
margins. Of note is British Columbia, which is the only province to have increased their charge 
1998 2014 % Change Significance 1998 2014 % Change Significance
Canada 78.9% 49.6% -37.2% *** 90.9% 83.9% -7.7% *
Alberta 80.7% 21.2% -73.7% *** 98.8% 76.0% -23.1% ***
British Columbia 23.7% 24.2% 2.2% *** 69.3% 36.4% -47.5%
Saskatchewan 85.7% 54.7% -36.2% *** 100.0% 97.3% -2.7%
Manitoba 95.4% 50.0% -47.6% *** 98.9% 88.2% -10.9%
Ontario 79.5% 47.0% -40.9% *** 90.9% 89.9% -1.1%
Quebec 68.4% 60.1% -12.2% *** 88.2% 88.8% 0.7%
Newfoundland 84.7% 49.2% -41.9% *** N/A N/A N/A
Nova Scotia 69.5% 39.3% -43.4% *** 97.6% 68.3% -30.0% ***
New Brunswick 95.5% 52.9% -44.6% *** 100.0% 76.7% -23.3% *
1998 2014 % Change Significance 1998 2014 % Change Significance
Canada 89.9% 86.9% -3.4% ** 98.1% 96.7% -1.4%
Alberta 90.2% 90.9% 0.8% ** 91.2% 94.4% 3.6%
British Columbia 73.5% 56.0% -23.8% * 98.2% 89.8% -8.5% **
Saskatchewan 94.9% 87.6% -7.8% 97.1% 100.0% 3.0%
Manitoba 100.0% 98.4% -1.6% 99.1% 98.4% -0.7%
Ontario 87.8% 83.3% -5.1% 98.1% 98.2% 0.1% **
Quebec 87.2% 91.8% 5.3% 98.3% 94.0% -4.4%
Newfoundland 92.9% 50% -46.2% *** N/A N/A N/A
Nova Scotia 88.8% 85.1% -4.1% 96.8% 87.5% -9.6% *
New Brunswick 92.9% 71.3% -23.2% *** 66.7% 100.0% 50.0% **
Level of Significance: ≤10% = *; ≤5% = **; ≤1% = ***
Sign = coefficient of the trendline
The level of significance column was determined by assessing the P-value from each provincial trendline. The trendline was from a 
regression of the charge rates for all the jurisdictions in a province on a time variable. The level of significance indicates the 
probability that the equation of the trendline, and thereby the model, was a result of random chance.
Table 6.1: Median Charge Rates over time
Cannabis Possession Cocaine Possession
Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP
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rate for cannabis possession, and whose charge rates for cannabis and cocaine possession, and 
cannabis TDP in 1998 were much lower than any other province.  
 
 
6.4 Implementation Conversion – Jurisdictional Trends 
An examination of implementation conversion from a jurisdictional perspective reveals that 
many cities have seen their cannabis possession charge rates decline significantly since 1998. 
Table 6.2 shows that 32 out of the 49 examined jurisdictions had a statistically significant decline 
in their charge rates for cannabis possession since 1998, while 39 of the 49 jurisdictions saw 
declining trendlines (see Appendix A.1 for a full list of all cities). Cannabis TDP meanwhile, saw 
42 of the 49 jurisdictions with declining trendlines, 14 of which were statistically significant 
declines.8 It should be noted that most of the cities with increases in the charge rates for cannabis 
possession were in British Columbia, again revealing British Columbia to be an outlier among 
the provinces.  
                                                 
8 Statistical significance was determined by running a regression of the charge rates for each jurisdiction on a time 
variable, and then examining the P-value of the trendline for each jurisdiction.  
Figure 6.2 – Provincial Scatterplot of Cannabis Possession Charge Rates 
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6.5 Implementation Conversion – Graphical Conclusion 
These graphical representations and statistical summaries help to convey how many of the cities 
and provinces in the data set have seen declines in cannabis possession enforcement since 1998. 
Thus, we can conclude that implementation conversion has occurred most noticeably among 
cannabis possession, across many of the Canadian jurisdictions.  
In chapter one, a second research question was posed - if there is not equal enforcement across 
jurisdictions over time, what are some of the factors that affect police officers’ decisions to 
charge an individual for a drug crime? The previous analysis found that there is some variation in 
how police officers in jurisdictions choose to charge for drug offenses, especially with cannabis 
possession. Thereby, the analysis that follows will explore the variation that exists between 
jurisdictions to determine, when possible, which variables affect the charge rates of the examined 
drug offenses.  
 
6.6 Population  
An examination of population against the charge rates, using a simple graphical analysis, does 
not adequately convey meaningful results. Since the population in most jurisdictions has been 
increasing over time, it is difficult to discern graphically if population by itself is having an 
effect, as the visible effect could be the result of growing populations over time.  Thereby, to 
determine the differential impact that time and population might have on the charge rates, it is 
necessary to use regression analysis. The question as to whether population has any effect on the 
charge rate of a jurisdiction will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
Cannabis Possession Cocaine Possession Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP
Significance level of 99% 21 6 5 3
Significance level of 95% 8 5 6 3
Significance level of 90% 3 2 3 2
Number of Jurisdictions with 
Declining Trendlines
39 29 42 23
Table 6.2 – Number of Jurisdictions with a Significant Change to their Charge Rate
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6.7 Police Force 
An examination of the Police Force variable begins with Figure 6.3, which shows the median 
charge rates over time for cannabis and cocaine possession, separated by Police Force. The 
RCMP are shown to have lower charge rates than municipal police for possession. However, the 
province of British Columbia was found to have significantly lower charge rates among its 
jurisdictions for all drug offenses other than cocaine TDP, and British Columbia has several of 
the RCMP policed jurisdictions in this analysis. Thus, including British Columbia in the analysis 
of police force weights the charge rates of the RCMP noticeably downwards for cannabis and 
cocaine possession. Thereby, the impact of British Columbia needs to be separated out from the 
analysis. In Figure 6.4, the province of British Columbia is excluded from the analysis, resulting 
in charge rates for possession offenses that are more closely aligned between the police forces. 
Again, British Columbia was found to be an outlier that affected the resulting analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Median Charge Rate for Possession by Police Force, including British Columbia 
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6.8 Provincial Party 
The graphical analysis of the provincial parties begins with a look at the median charge rates 
over time, colored by provincial party. Two of the provincial parties, Parti Quebecois and the 
Saskatchewan Party are each represented in only one province. The Saskatchewan Party is 
mostly comprised of former Progressive Conservatives, and aligns their political ideology with 
conservatism. Thereby, the Saskatchewan Party will be labelled as Progressive Conservatives for 
the proceeding analysis. Parti Quebecois has historically held Quebec sovereignty as one of their 
primary political motivations. Parti Quebecois only governed for a portion of the observed time 
period, resulting in an incomplete analysis. As such, they will thereby be excluded from the 
analysis. The NDP is mainly represented through the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 
the Liberals in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec, and the PC in Alberta, Ontario, and 
Saskatchewan.  
As the graphical analysis shows, the charge rates for all drug offenses were similar under 
different provincial parties, except for a few years in the early 2000s. Figure 6.5, which examines 
cannabis and cocaine possession, shows that from 2004 – 2014, the provincial parties exhibited 
Figure 6.4 – Median Charge Rate for Possession by Police Force, excluding British Colombia 
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charge rates that were similar to one another, and displayed little variability over time. The same 
results can be found in Figure 6.6, which examines cannabis and cocaine TDP. Most of the 
variation present from 1998-2004 is a result of Liberal parties, who in 2001 governed with the 
highest median charge rate for cannabis possession amongst provincial parties (97%), and then 
two years later, the lowest median charge rate for cannabis possession amongst the provincial 
parties (7%). However, these extreme values are the result of provincial outliers; Newfoundland 
was the only Liberal governed province in 2001, and in 2003 the Liberal Party was 
overrepresented in British Columbia in the data set. Newfoundland had some of the highest 
cannabis possession charge rates in the country in 2001, while British Columbia already had the 
lowest charge rates for cocaine and cannabis possession when the Liberals came into power in 
2002. Thereby, this blip in the data is explained by provincial factors and not party factors. 
Appendix A.2 and A.3 illustrates this point by showing how the median charge rates of Liberal 
governments for cannabis and cocaine possession were more closely aligned in 2002 and 2003, 
when British Colombia is excluded from the analysis. Overall, this analysis shows that charge 
rates for possession amongst provincial parties have displayed little variability over time, and 
that charge rates in British Colombia were shown to have been outliers.  
 
 
Figure 6.5 – Median Charge Rates of Cannabis and Cocaine Possession by Provincial Party 
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6.9 Federal Party  
The graphical analysis of the federal parties reveals the impact that a federal party has on charge 
rates. Figure 6.7 depicts the national median charge rate for cannabis possession in every year, 
colored by the federal party. This was the only drug offense to show any distinct variability over 
time. In Figure 6.7, two distinct periods can be observed: 1998-2002 when the median likelihood 
of a charge was between 79%-75%, and 2003-2014 when the median likelihood of a charge was 
50-59%. The sudden and sustained drop in the charge rate from 2002-2003 was likely caused by 
the Liberal government attempts to decriminalize cannabis possession in the early 2000’s. 
Although these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, they may have sent a strong signal to police 
departments across Canada that the federal government did not think of cannabis possession as 
an enforcement priority.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Median Charge Rates of Cannabis and Cocaine TDP by Provincial Party 
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6.10 Non-Violent Crime Severity Index 
The analysis of the Non-Violent Crime Severity Index (NV-CSI) on the charge rates of the 
provinces reveals that there are few observable relationships occurring. Table 6.3 summarizes the 
sign of the coefficient and the significance level of the trendline for each provinces’ NV-CSI 
scatterplot. As Table 6.3 shows, there is little consistency among each of the drug offenses; there 
is neither a positive nor negative relationship between the charge rate and the NV-CSI occurring 
among the provinces. Many of the statistically significant relationships occurred with cannabis 
possession; five of the nine provinces were statistically significant at the one percent level. 
However, these statistically significant relationships for cannabis possession were positive 
trendlines for some provinces, and negative trendlines for other provinces. Cocaine TDP 
recorded four statistically significant relationships among the provinces, while cocaine 
possession, and cannabis TDP each had three. Manitoba was the only province to have at least 
three statistically significant relationships among the drug offenses, and each sign of their 
coefficient was negative for every drug offense.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 – National Median Charge Rate by Federal Party 
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6.11 Violent Crime Severity Index 
The analysis of the Violent Crime Severity Index (V-CSI) reveals that there is little consistency 
between this variable and the charge rates for drug offenses among the provinces. Table 6.4 
summarizes the sign of the coefficient and the level of significance of the trendline for each 
provinces V-CSI scatterplot. As the table depicts, there is little consistency among the drug 
offenses and no observable patterns. There are both positive and negative relationships occurring 
between the provinces and the drug offenses. In cannabis possession, there are six statistically 
significant relationships that were observed; three of these are positive relationships, while three 
are negative relationships. Among all the other drug offenses, there are only six statistically 
significant relationships.  
 
 
 
Province Sign Significance Sign Significance
British Colombia - *** -
Alberta + -
Saskatchewan - *** - ***
Manitoba - *** -
Ontario + *** - **
Quebec + *** +
New Brunswick + +
Nova Scotia + +
Newfoundland + + *
Province Sign Significance Sign Significance
British Colombia - +
Alberta + -
Saskatchewan - -  
Manitoba - ** - **
Ontario + - **
Quebec - + **
New Brunswick + *** - ***
Nova Scotia - *** +
Newfoundland + +
Level of Significance: ≤10% = *; ≤5% = **; ≤1% = ***
Sign = coefficient of the trendline
Cannabis Possession Cocaine Possession
Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP
Table 6.3 – Non-Violent CSI Sign and Significance by Province
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Interestingly, when the relationships in both the Violent and Non-Violent CSI are observed side-
by-side, many of the provinces have the same positive or negative trendline for each drug offense 
(Appendix A.4). This may be the result of police forces that do not change their enforcement 
practices based on the type of crime that is being committed (violent vs. non-violent), but rather 
the volume of crime that is being committed. As the analysis has shown, there is no consistent 
relationship between the V-CSI and the charge rates, although each province tends to have the 
same positive or negative relationship between the drug offense and each CSI.  
 
6.12 Charge Approval Process  
Of the provinces with a charge approval process (British Columbia, Quebec and New 
Brunswick), British Columbia has the lowest charge rates for three of the four drug offenses. 
Table 6.5 depicts a table which summarizes the charge rates in each province in 1998 and 2014, 
as well as the percentage change that occurred between 1998 and 2014. The provinces with a 
charge approval process have been highlighted in red. In all the displayed drug offense 
Province Sign Significance Sign Significance
British Colombia - ** -
Alberta + -
Saskatchewan - *** -
Manitoba - *** -
Ontario + *** -
Quebec + *** + **
New Brunswick + * +
Nova Scotia + + *
Newfoundland - -
Province Sign Significance Sign Significance
British Colombia - +
Alberta + -
Saskatchewan + -  
Manitoba - * - **
Ontario + +
Quebec + -
New Brunswick + ** -
Nova Scotia - *** +
Newfoundland - +
Level of Significance: ≤10% = *; ≤5% = **; ≤1% = ***
Sign = coefficient of the trendline
Table 6.4 – Violent CSI Sign and Significance by Province
Cannabis Possession Cocaine Possession
Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP
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categories, British Columbia has noticeably lower charge rates than Quebec and New Brunswick, 
whom also employ a charge approval process. British Columbia’s higher evidentiary threshold 
could be impacting the charge rates, or it could represent the unique views and attitudes of 
British Columbia’s law enforcement agencies.  
 
6.13 Conclusion – Graphical Analysis 
In this chapter, graphical analyses and statistical summaries indicated that implementation 
conversion for cannabis possession has occurred across many Canadian jurisdictions. This 
analyses also exploited the variation that exists between jurisdictions to determine which 
variables affected the charge rates. British Columbia was found to be an outlier in much of the 
analysis, and affected the interpretation of the analysis with the variables Police Force, and 
Provincial Party. The CSI was shown to be statistically significant in some circumstances, and 
the charge approval process was shown to not uniformly affect charge rates among those 
provinces that employ the process. To more definitively discern the impact of these variables on 
1998 2014 % Change Significance 1998 2014 % Change Significance
Canada 78.9% 49.6% -37.2% *** 90.9% 83.9% -7.7% *
Alberta 80.7% 21.2% -73.7% *** 98.8% 76.0% -23.1% ***
British Columbia 23.7% 24.2% 2.2% *** 69.3% 36.4% -47.5%
Saskatchewan 85.7% 54.7% -36.2% *** 100.0% 97.3% -2.7%
Manitoba 95.4% 50.0% -47.6% *** 98.9% 88.2% -10.9%
Ontario 79.5% 47.0% -40.9% *** 90.9% 89.9% -1.1%
Quebec 68.4% 60.1% -12.2% *** 88.2% 88.8% 0.7%
Newfoundland 84.7% 49.2% -41.9% *** N/A N/A N/A
Nova Scotia 69.5% 39.3% -43.4% *** 97.6% 68.3% -30.0% ***
New Brunswick 95.5% 52.9% -44.6% *** 100.0% 76.7% -23.3% *
1998 2014 % Change Significance 1998 2014 % Change Significance
Canada 89.9% 86.9% -3.4% ** 98.1% 96.7% -1.4%
Alberta 90.2% 90.9% 0.8% ** 91.2% 94.4% 3.6%
British Columbia 73.5% 56.0% -23.8% * 98.2% 89.8% -8.5% **
Saskatchewan 94.9% 87.6% -7.8% 97.1% 100.0% 3.0%
Manitoba 100.0% 98.4% -1.6% 99.1% 98.4% -0.7%
Ontario 87.8% 83.3% -5.1% 98.1% 98.2% 0.1% **
Quebec 87.2% 91.8% 5.3% 98.3% 94.0% -4.4%
Newfoundland 92.9% 50% -46.2% *** N/A N/A N/A
Nova Scotia 88.8% 85.1% -4.1% 96.8% 87.5% -9.6% *
New Brunswick 92.9% 71.3% -23.2% *** 66.7% 100.0% 50.0% **
Level of Significance: ≤10% = *; ≤5% = **; ≤1% = ***
Sign = coefficient of the trendline
The level of significance column was determined by assessing the P-value from each provincial trendline. The trendline was from a 
regression of the charge rates for all the jurisdictions in a province on a time variable. The level of significance indicates the probability 
that the equation of the trendline, and thereby the model, was a result of random chance.
Table 6.5: Change in Provincial Median Charge Rates over time
Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP
Cannabis Possession Cocaine Possession
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the various charge rates, the effect of the other explanatory variables must be held constant. The 
next chapter presents the results of the multiple regression that was carried out on each 
dependent variable. 
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7.0 Regression Results  
7.1 Introduction 
The graphical analysis in the previous chapter provided an initial exploration of the relationships 
between cannabis possession charge rates and various explanatory variables. The key 
relationship of interest, of course, is the one between the cannabis possession charge rate and 
year, since the nature of this relationship provides an indication of whether implementation 
conversion has taken place. While the graphical analysis showed that charge rates have generally 
fallen over time (i.e., the relationship between cannabis possession charge rates and year is 
negative), this analysis is partial in the sense that it does not capture the effect of the other 
explanatory variables that might also have an impact on the charge rates and that are correlated 
to some degree with cannabis charge rates. To effectively hold the other explanatory variables 
constant, multiple regression analysis was undertaken. The results of this regression analysis are 
presented below.  
The regression analysis examines four different dependent variables: the charge rates for 
cannabis possession, cocaine possession, cannabis TDP, and cocaine TDP. The examination of 
four different charge rates is important since a comparison across the different charge rates 
allows for a determination of whether the relationship between cannabis possession charge rates 
and year is different than the relationship between other charge rates and year.  
For each of these four dependent variables, a set of six regression models were estimated. In each 
case the analysis begins with a simple regression of year on the charge rate – this is captured in 
Model 1. Model 2 then adds dummy variables for the provinces, while Model 3 adds dummy 
variables for the nature of the political party in power at the federal and provincial levels. Model 
4 adds a dummy variable for the RCMP and a variable capturing population. Model 5 adds 
dummy variables for the presence of a minority government at the federal and provincial level. 
Model 6 adds variables for violent and non-violent CSI. A dummy variable for the ‘Charge 
Approval Process’ was not included in the multiple regression analysis because it was too highly 
correlated with the dummy variables from three of the provinces.  
The final model with all the variables added (Model 6) can be expressed as follows: 
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Charge Rate =  𝛼 + 𝜏 Year + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ProvDum𝑖
8
𝑖=1
+ δ FedGovDum + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
3
𝑖=1
ProvGovDum𝑖
+ 𝜙 RCMP + 𝜆 Pop +  μ FedMaj + 𝜃 ProvMaj + 𝜉 ViolentCSI
+ 𝜌 NonViolentCSI + 𝜀 
Of particular importance in the analysis is what happens to the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient on Year as the analysis proceeds from Model 1 to Model 6. If the estimated sign and 
magnitude of the coefficient 𝜏 on Year remains relatively constant across the various models 
(i.e., as the rest of the explanatory variables are added) then this is evidence that some of the 
obvious political and economic factors that might have affected the charge rate have not changed 
in a systematic way over time and thus making the impact of Year appear to be bigger than it is. 
In other words, if Year still has an effect after these other variables have been added, then we 
have more confidence that the charge rate has changed over time. 
 
7.2 Cannabis Possession Charge Rate 
Table 7.1 presents the regression results for the dependent variable Cannabis Possession Charge 
Rate. The values presented in the table are the estimated coefficients for the various explanatory 
variables, with the t-values reported in brackets below the parameter estimates. The coefficients 
marked by asterisks are statistically significant at either the 10 percent (*), five percent (**) or 
one percent (***) level.  
A comparison of Models 1 to 6 indicates that the Cannabis Possession Charge Rate and Year are 
negatively related across all the model specifications; this relationship is statistically significant 
at the one percent level in all the models. There is a change in the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient on Year with the introduction of additional explanatory variables; specifically, as 
additional variables are added, the estimated coefficient becomes larger in absolute value terms. 
These results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that implementation conversion is 
taking place. In addition, the results indicate that simply examining the relationship between 
cannabis charge rates and year without considering the other explanatory variables results in an 
underestimation of the extent to which implementation conversion is occurring. 
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Since Model 6 provides a larger adjusted R2 than the other models and most of the explanatory 
variables retain their statistical significance in this model, the focus of the rest of the analysis is 
on Model 6. Consider first the provincial dummy variables, where Alberta is the province that is 
left out of the analysis. All the provincial dummy variables are statistically significant at the one 
percent level; these results indicate that each of the provinces have a base cannabis charge rate 
(i.e., the rate before the effect of the explanatory variables is considered) that is statistically 
different from that of Alberta. Among the provinces, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and 
Newfoundland have higher initial charge rates than Alberta. The largest difference in the base 
charge rates occurs in British Columbia, where the base charge rate is 42% less than in Alberta.  
The estimated coefficients for the dummy variables for the federal parties are calculated using 
the Federal Conservative party as the comparison point. As anticipated, federal Liberal 
governments had an estimated charge rate that was less than the federal Conservative Party; the 
estimated difference was 7.1 percent, with a level of statistical significance of one percent. For 
the provincial dummy variables, the comparison point is Provincial Liberal. Only Provincial 
NDP has an estimated coefficient that is statistically significant from Provincial Liberal; the 
estimated difference was 8.9 percent, with a level of statistical significant of one percent.  
While the RCMP variable was a statistically significant estimate in Models 4 and 5, this 
statistical significance disappeared in Model 6. Thus, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis 
that the presence of the RCMP had no impact on the cannabis possession charge rate.  The 
impact of the Population variable on the charge rate of cannabis possession was so minimal that 
the regression program did not return a numerical value. Thus, it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that Population has no impact on the cannabis possession charge rate. Population does 
not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the charge rate. 
The estimated coefficient on Provincial Majority is negative and not statistically significant, 
while the estimated coefficient on Federal Majority is positive and statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. This suggests that a majority federal government has a higher charge rate 
(2.6%) than a minority federal government, although this conclusion needs to be tempered by the 
fact that the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
The Violent-CSI has a statistically positive relationship with the cannabis possession charge rate 
(the charge rate increases by 0.1% for every 1-point increase in the Violent-CSI), while the Non-
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Violent-CSI has a negative relationship with the charge rate (a 1-point increase in the Non-
Violent-CSI is associated with a -0.1% change in the charge rate). The Violent-CSI variable is 
significant at the five percent level, and the Non-Violent-CSI at the one percent level. The 
negative estimate for the Non-Violent-CSI is consistent with the idea that police forces have a 
limited pool of resources with which to pursue charges for non-violent offenses; thus, as effort 
shifts to deal with Non-Violent crimes, the effort devoted to deal with cannabis possession is 
lowered. The estimate for the Violent-CSI is consistent with the idea that jurisdictions with a 
higher incidence of violent crimes are provided with more resources available to pursue charges 
for other offenses; the estimate is also consistent with the idea that violent crime incidents are 
more likely to include cannabis possession offenses among each incident.  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Year -0.015 -0.014 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.025
t = -9.101
***
t = -12.109
***
t = -9.122
***
t = -9.180
***
t = -9.486
***
t = -10.906
***
Province: British Columbia -0.427 -0.43 -0.432 -0.434 -0.438
t = -19.068*** t = -15.776*** t = -15.931*** t = -15.818*** t = -16.412***
Province: Manitoba 0.13 0.186 0.176 0.181 0.198
t = 4.737*** t = 5.507*** t = 5.192*** t = 5.313*** t = 5.814***
Province: NewBrunswick -0.053 -0.06 -0.057 -0.058 -0.111
t = -1.818* t = -2.037** t = -1.947* t = -1.981** t = -3.769***
Province: Newfoundland 0.141 0.135 0.113 0.111 0.087
t = 4.504*** t = 4.257*** t = 3.415*** t = 3.367*** t = 2.702***
Province: Nova Scotia -0.087 -0.075 -0.077 -0.087 -0.107
t = -2.766*** t = -2.364** t = -2.443** t = -2.686*** t = -3.309***
Province: Ontario -0.059 -0.072 -0.098 -0.105 -0.125
t = -3.004*** t = -3.118*** t = -3.950*** t = -4.223*** t = -5.165***
Province: Quebec -0.038 -0.079 -0.107 -0.106 -0.123
t = -1.682* t = -2.484** t = -3.260*** t = -3.222*** t = -3.831***
Province: Saskatchewan 0.077 0.115 0.117 0.115 0.15
t = 3.243*** t = 4.237*** t = 4.330*** t = 4.254*** t = 5.472***
Federal Government: Liberal -0.066 -0.067 -0.081 -0.071
t = -3.039
***
t = -3.087
***
t = -3.622
***
t = -3.250
***
Provincial Government: NDP -0.083 -0.083 -0.093 -0.089
t = -3.178
***
t = -3.183
***
t = -3.548
***
t = -3.489
***
Provincial Government: PQ 0.046 0.047 0.024 0.026
t = 1.501 t = 1.523 t = 0.770 t = 0.838
Provincial Government: PC -0.019 -0.019 -0.024 -0.021
t = -1.049 t = -1.068 t = -1.304 t = -1.137
Police Force: RCMP -0.04 -0.04 0.011
t = -2.560** t = -2.558** t = 0.623
Population 0 0 0
t = 1.203 t = 1.193 t = 0.168
Provincial Majority -0.021 -0.028
t = -1.097 t = -1.455
Federal Majority 0.026 0.023
t = 1.953
*
t = 1.734
*
Violent CSI 0.001
t = 2.502**
Non-Violent CSI -0.001
t = -6.016
***
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.56 0.571 0.575 0.578 0.601
Note: 
Table 7.1: Cannabis Possession Charge Rate - Regression Results
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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7.3  Cocaine Possession Charge Rate 
Table 7.2 presents the regression results for the dependent variable Cocaine Possession Charge 
Rate. A comparison of Models 1 to 6 indicates that the Cocaine Possession Charge Rate and 
Year are negatively related across all the model specifications; this relationship is statistically 
significant in all the models, although it is only significant at the one percent level in Models 1, 
2, and 6. Additionally, as further variables are introduced in successive models, the value of the 
estimated coefficient for Year declines slightly, although Model 6 produces the largest 
coefficient in absolute value terms (-.008).  
Since Model 6 provides a larger adjusted R2 than the other models, the focus of the rest of the 
analysis is again on Model 6. Consider first the provincial dummy variables, where Alberta is the 
province that is left out of the analysis. With Cocaine Possession, only four provinces return 
results that are statistically significant when compared to Alberta (all at the one percent level): 
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec. All these provinces have lower charge rates 
than Alberta; the largest difference in the base charge rate again occurs in British Columbia, 
whose base charge rate is 45% less than in Alberta.   
The estimated coefficients for the dummy variables for the federal parties are calculated using 
the Federal Conservative party as the comparison point, while the provincial dummy variables 
used the provincial Liberals as the comparison point. Although the federal Liberals once more 
had a lower charge rate than the federal Conservatives, this result was not statistically significant. 
None of the provincial parties returned a statistically significant result.  
The RCMP variable was found to have a negative coefficient, resulting in a base charge rate that 
is 7% less than the Municipal police force. This result was statistically significant at the one 
percent level in each of the models. This result is different than what had been hypothesized, and 
may reflect the much lower charge rates of jurisdictions in British Columbia, of which several 
RCMP policed jurisdictions were captured in the data set. Nevertheless, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the presence of the RCMP had no impact on the cocaine possession charge rate. 
The impact of the Population variable on the cocaine possession charge rate was so minimal, that 
the regression program did not return a numerical value, although the coefficient was positive, 
and the result was significant at the ten percent level. Thus, it is possible to reject the hypothesis 
that Population does not have an impact on the cocaine possession charge rate.  
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The estimated coefficient on Provincial Majority is negative and not statistically significant, 
while the estimated coefficient in Federal Majority is positive and is not statistically significant.  
The Violent CSI has a positive relationship with the cocaine possession charge rate, although this 
relationship is not statistically significant, while the Non-Violent CSI has a negative relationship 
with the cocaine possession charge rate (a 1-point increase in the Non-Violent CSI is associated 
with a -0.1% change in the charge rate), and is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The results for the Non-Violent CSI are consistent with the idea that police forces have a limited 
pool of resources with which to pursue charges for non-violent offenses, as had been observed 
with the Cannabis Possession Charge Rate variable. 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Year -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008
t = -2.901*** t = -3.356*** t = -1.796* t = -1.788* t = -2.106** t = -3.125***
Province: British Columbia -0.42 -0.445 -0.446 -0.449 -0.454
t = -20.533*** t = -16.705*** t = -17.439*** t = -16.976*** t = -17.179***
Province: Manitoba 0.116 0.07 0.044 0.047 0.051
t = 4.319*** t = 1.937* t = 1.258 t = 1.346 t = 1.412
Province: New Brunswick 0.003 -0.005 -0.011 -0.012 -0.045
t = 0.103 t = -0.178 t = -0.360 t = -0.399 t = -1.425
Province: Newfoundland 0.086 0.087 0.035 0.039 0.036
t = 1.860* t = 1.876* t = 0.772 t = 0.859 t = 0.801
Province: Nova Scotia -0.033 -0.048 -0.091 -0.098 -0.115
t = -0.973 t = -1.373 t = -2.638
***
t = -2.767
***
t = -3.158
***
Province: Ontario 0.033 0.018 -0.036 -0.041 -0.063
t = 1.879* t = 0.825 t = -1.578 t = -1.778* t = -2.598***
Province: Quebec 0.017 0.001 -0.058 -0.06 -0.081
t = 0.860 t = 0.017 t = -1.965
**
t = -2.011
**
t = -2.656
***
Province: Saskatchewan 0.063 0.037 0.009 0.008 0.03
t = 2.424** t = 1.266 t = 0.319 t = 0.295 t = 0.990
Federal Government: Liberal -0.0002 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008
t = -0.007 t = -0.257 t = -0.540 t = -0.400
Provincial Government: NDP 0.03 0.02 0.012 0.014
t = 1.035 t = 0.704 t = 0.417 t = 0.487
Provincial Government: PQ -0.008 -0.005 -0.016 -0.021
t = -0.319 t = -0.196 t = -0.603 t = -0.777
Provincial Government: PC -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 -0.028
t = -1.082 t = -1.008 t = -1.166 t = -1.423
Police Force: RCMP -0.102 -0.101 -0.07
t = -6.026*** t = -5.922*** t = -3.565***
Population 0 0 0
t = 2.565
**
t = 2.561
**
t = 1.899
*
Provincial Majority -0.014 -0.022
t = -0.762 t = -1.138
Federal Majority 0.01 0.01
t = 0.782 t = 0.733
Violent CSI 0.0001
t = 0.543
Non-Violent CSI -0.001
t = -2.682***
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.618 0.618 0.647 0.647 0.652
Note:
Table 7.2: Cocaine Possession Charge Rate - Regression Results
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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7.4 Cannabis TDP Charge Rate 
Table 7.3 presents the regression results for the dependent variable Cannabis TDP Charge Rate. 
A comparison of Models 1 to 6 indicates that the Cannabis TDP Charge Rate and Year are 
negatively related across all the model specifications; this relationship is statistically significant 
in all the models, although it is only significant at the five percent level in Model 6. The absolute 
value of the estimated coefficient for Year increases slightly throughout the models, increasing 
by .002 from Model 1 to Model 6. These results provide weak evidence that implementation 
conversion is taking place with cannabis TDP, owing to the minimal change in the absolute value 
of Year over time.  
In this regression analysis, Model 4 provided the largest adjusted R2 than any other model. 
Thereby, this analysis will exclude those variables captured in Models 5 and 6, as none of the 
variables captured in Models 5 and 6 returned statistically significant results. Among the 
provincial dummy variables, of which Alberta is again the comparison point, only three 
provinces returned statistically significant results: British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. All 
three provinces had lower charge rates than Alberta, while Quebec was the only province who 
was not significant at the one percent level. Again, British Columbia exhibited the largest 
difference between the comparison point; their base charge rate was 22% lower than Alberta’s.  
The estimated coefficients for the federal parties are calculated using the federal Conservative 
party as the comparison point, while the provincial dummy variables used the provincial Liberals 
as the comparison point. The federal Liberals once more had a lower charge rate than the federal 
Conservatives, although this result was not statistically significant. None of the provincial parties 
returned a statistically significant result. 
The last variables to be examined in Model 4 are the RCMP dummy variable and Population. 
The RCMP variable was found to have a negative coefficient, resulting in a base charge rate for 
cannabis TDP that is 8.8% less than the Municipal police force, and was significant at the one 
percent level. Similar to the previous analysis, this result may reflect the much lower charge rates 
of jurisdictions in British Columbia, of which several RCMP policed jurisdictions were captured 
in the data set. The impact of the Population variable on the cannabis TDP charge rate was so 
minimal, that the regression program did not return a numerical value, although the coefficient 
was positive, and the result was significant at the ten percent level.  
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7.5 Cocaine TDP Charge Rate 
Table 7.4 presents the regression results for the last dependent variable to be analyzed, Cocaine 
TDP Charge Rate. A comparison of Models 1 to 6 indicates that the Cocaine TDP Charge Rate 
and Year are negatively related across all the model specifications. However, unlike every other 
dependent variable examined, this relationship is not statistically significant in any of the 
models. Based on these results, there is no evidence that implementation conversion has been 
taking place with cocaine TDP offenses, owing to the lack of statistical significance found in the 
regression results.  
In this regression analysis, Model 4 provided the largest adjusted R2 than any other model. 
Thereby, this analysis will exclude those variables captured in Models 5 and 6, as none of the 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Year -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
t = -3.309
***
t = -3.221
***
t = -1.951
*
t = -2.120
**
t = -2.239
**
t = -2.470
**
Province: British Columbia -0.204 -0.22 -0.219 -0.219 -0.22
t = -8.683*** t = -7.718*** t = -7.873*** t = -7.717*** t = -7.715***
Province: Manitoba 0.065 0.035 0.02 0.022 0.021
t = 2.336** t = 0.990 t = 0.587 t = 0.637 t = 0.591
Province: New Brunswick -0.022 -0.027 -0.022 -0.022 -0.034
t = -0.701 t = -0.837 t = -0.691 t = -0.701 t = -1.054
Province: Newfoundland 0.015 0.011 -0.027 -0.027 -0.03
t = 0.461 t = 0.331 t = -0.820 t = -0.822 t = -0.893
Province: Nova Scotia -0.018 -0.029 -0.048 -0.052 -0.059
t = -0.490 t = -0.785 t = -1.329 t = -1.408 t = -1.573
Province: Ontario -0.054 -0.063 -0.105 -0.108 -0.112
t = -2.660
***
t = -2.619
***
t = -4.275
***
t = -4.333
***
t = -4.472
***
Province: Quebec -0.002 -0.009 -0.054 -0.054 -0.056
t = -0.080 t = -0.266 t = -1.694
*
t = -1.684
*
t = -1.731
*
Province: Saskatchewan 0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.01 -0.006
t = 0.238 t = -0.480 t = -0.331 t = -0.368 t = -0.197
Federal Government: Liberal -0.009 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013
t = -0.426 t = -0.550 t = -0.700 t = -0.592
Provincial Government: NDP 0.023 0.022 0.019 0.019
t = 0.839 t = 0.837 t = 0.712 t = 0.699
Provincial Government: PQ -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017
t = -0.391 t = -0.395 t = -0.574 t = -0.556
Provincial Government: PC -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013
t = -0.663 t = -0.700 t = -0.701 t = -0.688
Police Force: RCMP -0.088 -0.088 -0.076
t = -5.324*** t = -5.309*** t = -4.067***
Population 0 0 0
t = 1.669* t = 1.666* t = 1.183
Provincial Majority -0.01 -0.011
t = -0.503 t = -0.541
Federal Majority 0.005 0.006
t = 0.383 t = 0.415
Violent-CSI 0.0002
t = 1.102
Non-Violent CSI -0.0003
t = -1.485
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.201 0.199 0.238 0.237 0.237
Note:
Table 7.3: Cannabis TDP Charge Rate - Regression Results
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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variables captured in Models 5 and 6 returned statistically significant results.  Among the 
dummy variables for Province, of which Alberta is again the comparison point, only British 
Columbia returned a statistically significant result (one percent level). British Columbia’s base 
charge rate for cocaine TDP was 6.8% less than Alberta’s.  
The estimated coefficients for the federal parties were calculated using the federal Conservative 
party as the comparison point, while the provincial dummy variables used the provincial Liberals 
as the comparison point. The federal Liberals once more had a lower charge rate than the federal 
Conservatives, although this result was not statistically significant. Among the provincial parties, 
only the NDP returned a statistically significant result (one percent level), as they exhibited a 
charge rate that was 4.9% less than the provincial Liberals.  
The last variables to be examined in Model 4 are the RCMP dummy variable and Population. 
The RCMP variable was found to have a negative coefficient, resulting in a base charge rate for 
cocaine TDP that is 3.1% less than the Municipal police force, and was significant at the one 
percent level. As it has been highlighted, this result likely reflects the much lower charge rates of 
jurisdictions in British Columbia, of which several RCMP policed jurisdictions were captured in 
the data set. The impact of the Population variable on the cocaine TDP charge rate was not found 
to be statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the regression analyses were presented and discussed for each drug offense. In 
each regression analysis, an emphasis was placed on examining the statistical significance of the 
variable Year throughout the model specifications, and whether the statistical significance of 
Year changed as additional explanatory variables were added. Overall, the Provincial variables 
and the Police Force variable were often found to produce statistically significant results. Table 
7.5 presents a summary table of the regression results. As Model 6 produced the largest adjusted 
R2 value among cannabis possession and cocaine possession, it was the model used to present the 
findings for each dependent variable. These results will help to guide a discussion of the findings 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Year -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
t = -1.124 t = -1.192 t = -0.703 t = -0.520 t = -0.704 t = -1.033
Province: British Columbia -0.055 -0.068 -0.068 -0.066 -0.066
t = -4.264
***
t = -4.251
***
t = -4.255
***
t = -4.019
***
t = -4.026
***
Province: Manitoba 0.061 0.01 0.003 0.005 0.004
t = 3.657*** t = 0.449 t = 0.120 t = 0.223 t = 0.163
Province: New Brunswick 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.007 -0.0001
t = 0.693 t = 0.480 t = 0.343 t = 0.392 t = -0.008
Province: Newfoundland 0.008 0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.01
t = 0.336 t = 0.269 t = -0.367 t = -0.344 t = -0.409
Province: Nova Scotia 0.016 0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.015
t = 0.780 t = 0.173 t = -0.355 t = -0.558 t = -0.676
Province: Ontario 0.035 0.03 0.016 0.016 0.012
t = 3.141
***
t = 2.242
**
t = 1.150 t = 1.093 t = 0.806
Province: Quebec 0.03 0.013 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.004
t = 2.427** t = 0.746 t = -0.014 t = 0.009 t = -0.200
Province: Saskatchewan 0.025 -0.004 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006
t = 1.629 t = -0.232 t = -0.684 t = -0.713 t = -0.278
Federal Government: Liberal -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
t = -0.683 t = -0.688 t = -0.664 t = -0.498
Provincial Government: NDP 0.05 0.049 0.048 0.05
t = 2.948
***
t = 2.870
***
t = 2.781
***
t = 2.891
***
Provincial Government: PQ 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.024
t = 1.571 t = 1.644 t = 1.510 t = 1.472
Provincial Government: PC -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
t = -0.487 t = -0.368 t = -0.194 t = -0.264
Police Force: RCMP -0.031 -0.03 -0.022
t = -2.915*** t = -2.884*** t = -1.695*
Population 0 0 0
t = -0.329 t = -0.324 t = -0.498
Provincial Majority -0.01 -0.011
t = -0.870 t = -0.964
Federal Majority -0.003 -0.003
t = -0.322 t = -0.343
Violent-CSI 0.00004
t = 0.260
Non-Violent CSI -0.0002
t = -1.073
Adjusted R
2
0.0004 0.133 0.15 0.159 0.157 0.157
Note:
Table 7.4: Cocaine TDP Charge Rate - Regression Results
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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in the next chapter in this thesis, by allowing the research questions and possible answers to be 
understood from a quantitative basis. 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables
Cannabis 
Possession: 
Model 6
Cocaine 
Possession: 
Model 6
Cannabis 
TDP: Model 6
Cocaine TDP: 
Model 6
Year -0.025 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002
t = -10.906*** t = -3.125
*** t = -2.470** t = -1.033
Province: British Columbia -0.438 -0.454 -0.22 -0.066
t = -16.412*** t = -17.179
*** t = -7.715*** t = -4.026***
Province: Manitoba 0.198 0.051 0.021 0.004
t = 5.814*** t = 1.412 t = 0.591 t = 0.163
Province: NewBrunswick -0.111 -0.045 -0.034 -0.0001
t = -3.769
*** t = -1.425 t = -1.054 t = -0.008
Province: Newfoundland 0.087 0.036 -0.03 -0.01
t = 2.702*** t = 0.801 t = -0.893 t = -0.409
Province: Nova Scotia -0.107 -0.115 -0.059 -0.015
t = -3.309*** t = -3.158
*** t = -1.573 t = -0.676
Province: Ontario -0.125 -0.063 -0.112 0.012
t = -5.165*** t = -2.598
*** t = -4.472*** t = 0.806
Province: Quebec -0.123 -0.081 -0.056 -0.004
t = -3.831
***
t = -2.656
***
t = -1.731
*
t = -0.200
Province: Saskatchewan 0.15 0.03 -0.006 -0.006
t = 5.472*** t = 0.990 t = -0.197 t = -0.278
Federal Government: Liberal -0.071 -0.008 -0.013 -0.006
t = -3.250*** t = -0.400 t = -0.592 t = -0.498
Provincial Government: NDP -0.089 0.014 0.019 0.05
t = -3.489*** t = 0.487 t = 0.699 t = 2.891***
Provincial Government: PQ 0.026 -0.021 -0.017 0.024
t = 0.838 t = -0.777 t = -0.556 t = 1.472
Provincial Government: PC -0.021 -0.028 -0.013 -0.003
t = -1.137 t = -1.423 t = -0.688 t = -0.264
Police Force: RCMP 0.011 -0.07 -0.076 -0.022
t = 0.623 t = -3.565*** t = -4.067*** t = -1.695*
Population 0 0 0 0
t = 0.168 t = 1.899* t = 1.183 t = -0.498
Provincial Majority -0.028 -0.022 -0.011 -0.011
t = -1.455 t = -1.138 t = -0.541 t = -0.964
Federal Majority 0.023 0.01 0.006 -0.003
t = 1.734* t = 0.733 t = 0.415 t = -0.343
Violent CSI 0.001 0.0001 0.0002 0.00004
t = 2.502** t = 0.543 t = 1.102 t = 0.260
Non-Violent CSI -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0002
t = -6.016*** t = -2.682
*** t = -1.485 t = -1.073
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.652 0.237 0.157
Note: 
Table 7.5: Summary of Regression Results
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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8.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
At the beginning of this thesis, the possibility was raised that, overall, the degree of enforcement 
of cannabis possession laws was falling, and that law enforcement agencies were inconsistently 
enforcing cannabis possession laws across jurisdictions in Canada. The purpose of this thesis, 
was to undertake an analysis of drug enforcement data from several Canadian cities to 
investigate the differing enforcement of cannabis laws, and determine whether implementation 
conversion is occurring in some jurisdictions. To this end, this thesis posed two research 
questions:  
i. Is implementation conversion in the enforcement of cannabis laws taking place across 
jurisdictions in Canada? 
ii. Is there equal enforcement across jurisdictions over time, and if not, what are some of the 
factors that affect police officers’ decisions to charge an individual for a drug crime?  
A graphical and regression analysis was then conducted on four dependent variables to answer 
these questions. The four dependent variables were cannabis possession, cannabis TDP, cocaine 
possession, and cocaine TDP. This chapter will discuss the implications of the analysis on the 
research questions.  
 
8.2 The Effect of Year on Implementation Conversion and Street-Level 
Bureaucrats 
The graphical analysis suggested that the variable Year contributed to a downward trend in all 
the drug offenses, except for cocaine TDP, while the regression analysis confirmed the statistical 
significance of this finding. Using Model 6 from each regression analysis, the size differential of 
the estimated coefficient on the variable Year was calculated between cannabis possession and 
the other dependent variables. The estimated coefficient on the variable Year for cannabis 
possession was 2.12 times greater than cocaine possession, 11.5 times greater than cocaine TDP, 
and 3.16 times greater than cannabis TDP, when the effects of the other explanatory variables 
were accounted for. The disproportionately large effect of the variable Year on cannabis 
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possession can be reaffirmed by calculating the percentage change in the charge rate that is 
explained by the time trend. Table 8.1 uses the estimated coefficient of Year in Model 6 of each 
regression analysis, and the national median charge rate at three points in time (1998, 2006, and 
2014), to calculate the percentage change in the charge rate that is explained by the time trend, 
for each dependent variable. As Table 8.1 shows, the time trend explains more of the charge rate 
for cannabis possession, than any other dependent variable.  
Of course, the variable Year is not thought to be directly contributing to lowered cannabis 
possession charge rates. Instead, Year is a proxy variable that captures a set of behaviours that 
are the underlying cause of declining charge rates. Since the coefficient on Year retained its 
statistical significance, and its magnitude was maintained or enhanced, with the addition of other 
key political and economic variables, there is greater confidence that the behaviours captured in 
the Year variable had an impact on the charge rate.  
There are several factors that may have contributed to this downward trend in the charge rate for 
cannabis possession: when resources are constrained, street-level bureaucrats had to make trade-
offs; a growing perception among police officers that non-cannabis offenses were important to 
enforce; and the creation of a medical cannabis industry that legitimized the use of cannabis 
among the public. These factors, and others, contributed to the phenomenon of implementation 
conversion – policy change that was characterized in this case by street-level bureaucrats who 
redirected the aims of the policy to achieve ends that are different from its original purpose, 
without changing the formal rules.  
Table 8.1: The Percentage Change in the Charge Rate that is 
explained by the Time Trend 
 Cannabis Poss.  Cocaine Poss. Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP 
1998 3.16% 0.88% 0.66% 0.20% 
2006 4.49% 0.90% 0.70% 0.20% 
2014 5.04% 0.95% 0.69% 0.20% 
 
As the literature on policy conversion makes clear, policy conversion has been characterized as a 
type of policy change brought forth by a central political actor who knowingly altered the 
interpretation or direction of a policy or institution (Hacker et al., 2013, pg. 8). This central 
political actor actively redirects resources elsewhere, and can thereby make substantive changes 
58 
 
by using policies and existing institutions for a new purpose. This thesis looks at a different 
question. It makes no attempt to examine what political or strategic actors are doing, but it 
instead looks at the implementation stage to discern how policy can change through alternative 
means. This thesis makes the claim that changes in policy outcomes do not always have to be a 
deliberate act by central policy actors. This thesis observed that street-level bureaucrats, not 
political actors, brought about substantive changes in cannabis possession charge rates across the 
country. Additionally, this change in cannabis policy was not a deliberate decision that was 
centrally made – it resulted from the collective discretion that decentralized decision-makers, 
street-level bureaucrats, exhibited in the job. These street-level bureaucrats shifted resources 
towards different ends, and as a result, cannabis possession charge rates declined in all provinces 
except for British Columbia, resulting in substantive changes to cannabis criminalization. In this 
case, implementation conversion occurred because of a decentralized group of street-level 
bureaucrats who made decisions independent of other jurisdictions to enforce cannabis 
possession less frequently.  
These findings reveal the influence that is provided to street-level bureaucrats in their jobs. 
When street-level bureaucrats are given discretion in their roles, this amounts to an ability to 
influence the implementation and enforcement of policy. Police officers, who exert discretion 
every day in their jobs, have considerable influence over the level of enforcement for various 
offenses, in part because their actions are costly to monitor. This is an example of the principal-
agent relationship, whereas the agent (police officers) might take actions that are different than 
what the policy has specified, because of information asymmetry. Street-level bureaucrats can 
act on their own, in part because of the inherent discretion afforded them in their jobs. As well, 
the constitutional separation of powers makes it almost impossible for the actions of police 
officers to be controlled by policy makers at the national level. Although there hadn’t been a 
formal change in cannabis policy, street-level bureaucrats used their discretion to influence the 
enforcement of this policy, to the point where charge rates dropped by nearly 30% for cannabis 
possession over a 16-year period.  
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8.4 Changing Public Attitudes 
The analysis showed that the declining charge rate for cannabis possession was not reflected in 
the other drug offenses, indicating a unique set of circumstances for cannabis possession. 
Cannabis possession might be unique in that public attitudes regarding cannabis consumption 
have changed dramatically over the past 20 years, as compared to cocaine consumption, and the 
trafficking of drugs. These changing public attitudes may have affected the discretion shown by 
police officers with cannabis possession laws.  
This sustained drop in the charge rate for cannabis possession reveals how policy can change in 
response to changing views of the public and street-level bureaucrats, even though no change 
had been made to formal policy. Over time, the public viewed recreational cannabis use as less 
of a threat, and this view was reflected in the enforcement practices of police officers throughout 
the country. The ability of policy to begin changing in advance of either full electoral support or 
expended political capital may be an important feature of government. This incremental change 
to policy over time may also make the formal changes easier, because the public has had time to 
slowly accept and adjust to the de facto change in policy.  
 
8.5 Provincial Outliers Factors 
The graphical and regression analysis also revealed that there is something unique occurring in 
British Columbia. As compared to the other provinces, British Columbia had the lowest charge 
rates among the four dependent variables. If these low charge rates were the result of the charge 
approval process, then we would have expected to see lower than average charge rates in New 
Brunswick and Quebec. However, Quebec and New Brunswick had similar charge rates to the 
other provinces. One of the reasons for British Columbia’s abnormally low charge rates might be 
the ‘substantial’ evidentiary threshold that is only in place in British Columbia. The legal system 
in British Columbia may also deal with low-level drug offenses in a manner that is less punitive 
and more focused on rehabilitation. Regardless, the low charge rates in British Columbia 
noticeably affected the analysis of several variables.  
Notably, the charge rate for cannabis possession was slowly converging to a more common rate 
in all the provinces, during the observed time period. Those provinces with a high charge rate in 
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1998, mostly the Maritime Provinces and Western Provinces, saw their cannabis possession 
charge rates decline rapidly throughout the observed time period. Ontario and Quebec, which 
had more moderate charge rates in 1998, saw their charge rates decline more slowly. British 
Columbia, whose charge rates were the lowest of any province, saw their charge rates increase 
over time to match some of the other provinces. This congruence of provincial charge rates for 
cannabis possession may indicate that public sentiment concerning recreational cannabis use was 
becoming more similar. It could have also resulted from a type of policy learning, whereby some 
jurisdictions saw what other jurisdictions were doing with cannabis possession charges, and 
chose to emulate those policy choices, because the effects of the lowered charges were seen as 
working well. Additionally, there may have been a collective pressure on police officers across 
Canada to focus their efforts on different criminal offenses. In British Columbia’s case, police 
officers may have felt that to validate cannabis possession enforcement, a minimum standard 
must be applied, leading to increasing charge rates.  
 
8.6 Limitations 
This thesis includes a few limitations that may have affected the analysis and results. The only 
comparator drug chosen was cocaine, whereas the charge rates for other drugs might have been 
different. Cocaine offenses might be treated more seriously by police officers than the more 
common psychedelic drugs. Additionally, although the raw data that was used to calculate the 
charge rates had been collected prior to 1998, this data is not available electronically. A longer 
time period could have provided more context into the charge rates and how these drugs were 
being affected by the independent variables that were examined. As well, in the cases where a 
rural jurisdiction had three or fewer annual incidents recorded for a drug offense, the charge rate 
was not calculated for those drug offenses. This was done to prevent artificially high charge rates 
in some jurisdictions from skewing the jurisdictional analysis, but may have skewed some of the 
aggregate analysis. Lastly, we cannot know whether the impact of the explanatory variables are 
the really the same across all the jurisdictions, and whether all the relevant variables have been 
included. To the extent that these issues exist, the results of the analysis will not provide a proper 
measure of the factors at work in determining charge rates. 
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8.7 Areas for Future Research 
To gain a more comprehensive understanding of how charge rates have changed throughout 
Canada over the years, and whether implementation conversion has occurred with other drug 
offenses, additional drug offenses could be examined. Common psychedelic drugs, such as 
psilocybin and LSD, as well as more common street drugs, such as heroine and 
methamphetamines, could be examined in Canada’s Census Metropolitan Areas. Additionally, 
implementation conversion by street-level bureaucrats could be studied from a judicial 
perspective, rather than from an enforcement perspective. If aggregate court records could be 
obtained with sufficient detail, the effects of street-level bureaucrats in the judicial branch could 
be examined, as both judges and prosecutors are afforded discretion in their line of work.  
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10.0   Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City Province Sign Cannabis Poss. Sign Cocaine Poss. Sign Cannabis TDP Sign Cocaine TDP
Abbotsford BC + *** + - - *
Cranbrook BC + - - -
Kelowna BC + *** + - * -
Prince George BC + ** + - -
Revelstoke BC - + ** - * NA NA
Vancouver BC + ** - *** - *** - ***
Victoria BC - ** - *** - ** +
Banff AB - *** - *** - - *
Calgary AB - *** - - + *
Drumheller AB - *** - - -
Edmonton AB - * - * - ** - ***
Grand Prairie AB - *** - ** - * -
North Battleford SK - ** + - -
Regina SK - *** - - -
Saskatoon SK - + - -
Swift Current SK - *** - - NA NA
Yorkton SK - NA NA - NA NA
Brandon MN - *** - * - NA NA
Portage La Prairie MN - - - +
Winnipeg MN - *** - ** - ** - **
Level of Signficance: ≤10% = *; ≤5% = **; ≤1% = ***
Sign = coefficient of the trendline
Appendix A.1: Jurisditional Sign and Coefficient for each Drug Offense - Part 1 of 2
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City Province Sign Cannabis Poss. Sign Cocaine Poss. Sign Cannabis TDP Sign Cocaine TDP
Barrie ON + + - -
Brantford ON + + - + *
Guelph ON - * + - ** -
Hamilton ON - ** - - +
Hawkesbury ON - + - +
Kingston ON + + - + *
Kirkland Lake ON - + + +
Kitchner ON - *** - - *** +
London ON - *** - + +
Ottawa-Gatineau ON - *** + - *** -
Peterborough ON - - - NA NA
St. Catherines ON + ** + *** - +
Sudbury ON - *** - - ** +
Thunder Bay ON - *** - ** - ** -
Toronto ON - *** - *** + ** +
Windsor ON - *** - *** - + ***
Montreal QB - *** - ** + +
Ottawa-Gatineau QB - ** - - -
Quebec City QB - ** + - - ***
Saguenay QB - ** + + ** -
Sherbrooke QB - ** - - - **
Trois-Rivieres QB - *** - + ** -
Campbellton NB - ** NA NA - NA NA
Moncton NB + - - +
Saint John NB - *** - ** - +
Corner Brook NL - *** NA NA - NA NA
St. Johns NL - *** - - *** + *
Halifax NS - *** - *** - *** - **
Yarmouth NS - * NA NA + ** NA NA
Level of Signficance: ≤10% = *; ≤5% = **; ≤1% = ***
Sign = coefficient of the trendline
Appendix A.1: Jurisditional Sign and Coefficient for each Drug Offense - Part 2 of 2
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A.2: Median Charge Rates for Possession, colored by Provincial Party, including British 
Columbia 
A.3: Median Charge Rates for Possession, colored by Provincial Party, excluding British 
Columbia 
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Cannabis Possession Cocaine Possession
Province  Same Sign b/w CSI's  Same Sign b/w CSI's
British Colombia Yes Yes
Alberta Yes Yes
Saskatchewan Yes Yes
Manitoba Yes Yes
Ontario Yes Yes
Quebec Yes Yes
New Brunswick Yes Yes
Nova Scotia Yes Yes
Newfoundland No No
Cannabis TDP Cocaine TDP
Province  Same Sign b/w CSI's  Same Sign b/w CSI's
British Colombia Yes Yes
Alberta Yes Yes
Saskatchewan No Yes
Manitoba Yes Yes
Ontario Yes No
Quebec No No
New Brunswick Yes Yes
Nova Scotia Yes Yes
Newfoundland No Yes
A.4: Summary Table of Consistent Signs between Crime 
Severity Index's by Province
